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ABSTRACT 
 The United States Special Operations Command provides guidance on the 
development of a robust Digital Mission Command capability to meet future challenges 
in the uncertain operational environment. Research into innovative, state-of-the-art data 
management using multi-dimensional cubic storage promises to provide a single digital 
ecosystem to serve as the foundation for the employment of cutting-edge decision 
dominance, assured communications, and data-driven technological capabilities. This 
thesis examines the feasibility of implementing a modern data strategy in support of 
Naval Special Warfare operations at the tactical edge in a contested communications 
environment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Naval Special Warfare (NSW) fills a key role within the special operations 
community. As the maritime component of the United States Operations Command, NSW 
specializes in the execution of special operations within the maritime, littoral, and riverine 
environments. NSW relies on a relatively small group of highly intelligent, highly trained 
personnel who excel at operating in uncertain environments to perform a wide range of 
core and supporting activities including direct action, special reconnaissance, counter-
terrorism, and unconventional warfare (Department of the Navy [DON], 2018). Often 
conducted in denied, hostile, and politically sensitive areas, NSW leverages the mission 
command framework of centralized planning and decentralized execution to achieve 
simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose (McRaven, 1993) in the 
accomplishment of mission objectives. 
Rapidly changing geopolitical, socio-economic, and technological conditions have 
presented new and evolving operational dilemmas for Joint Force Operations. With the 
return of Great Power Competition, the rise of non-state actors, the proliferation of 
advanced / disruptive technologies and a trend towards military problems below the level 
of traditional armed conflict, the Naval Special Warfare community will increasingly be 
called upon to employ their unique capabilities to provide a variety of understanding, 
influence, and precision actions that enable decisive operations by the Joint Force. This 
means that NSW must develop systems and processes that allow it to see itself, see the 
enemy, and quickly gain situational understanding of the operational environment to affect 
seamless horizontal and vertical integration in accordance with the tenants of mission 
command. 
A. DIGITAL MISSION COMMAND 
Digital Mission Command is derived from the United States Special Operations 
Command’s vision for a global command and control capability that provides unparalleled 
situational awareness to meet future challenges in an uncertain operational environment. 
This vision calls for the innovative use of existing and cutting-edge technologies to create 
2 
a highly responsive, all-domain C2 architecture that is networked physically, 
electronically, and virtually. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A problem exists with the incorporation of Digital Mission Command into routine 
operations across various organizations and operational levels of command. It is difficult 
to distribute operationally relevant data and information required in a suitable format 
within tactically relevant timelines to realize true shared-situational understanding and 
unity of effort within a heterogeneous information environment. This is a problem because 
the preponderance of disparate and incompatible data processing, data storage, and 
communication systems results in the inability to achieve interoperability and graceful 
degradation among current command and control systems. A study that examines the 
feasibility of implementing a common foundational storage layer and supporting network 
architecture may lead to a deeper understanding of the capabilities and limitations of an 
integrated Digital Mission Command system in support of NSW operations. 
C. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The purpose of this research is to increase understanding of the nature of Digital 
Mission Command as it relates to NSW operations and how to implement sharing of data, 
information, and knowledge at the enabling common data layer. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What is the nature of Digital Mission Command as it relates to NSW 
operations? 
2. What are the limitations of current communications and data architectures 
with regard to the implementation of NSW Digital Mission Command? 
3. What communications and data architectures would best support the 
implementation of NSW Digital Mission Command? 
4. What additional research is required to further the NSW Digital Mission 
Command initiative? 
3 
E. THESIS DESIGN 
This chapter lays out the context and background related to the problem of 
implementing Digital Mission Command. Chapter II of this thesis presents an in-depth 
overview of the principles of command and control, command and control systems, 
mission command and literature relevant to the problem and related context. Chapter III 
describes the methodology for the research and analysis of the problem. Chapter IV 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This thesis explores efforts to create digital mission command within the Naval 
Special Warfare community, such that it aligns to the broader Special Operations 
Command digital mission command initiatives. Prior to analysis, this chapter aims to 
establish a common understanding of the Naval Special Warfare mission, the principles of 
command and control in general, and how they relate to mission command. Additionally, 
it will provide an overview of the various command and control systems and describes 
essential information technology elements and data strategy connotations. 
B. NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE OVERVIEW 
Naval Special Warfare (NSW), also known as Naval Special Operations Forces 
(NAVSOF) is the maritime component of the United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM). NSW is responsible for the conduct of special operations within maritime, 
littoral and riverine environments to project power on, below, and from the sea (DON, 
2018). 
NSW is an agile force comprised of approximately 9,200 personnel. Members of 
this elite organization include SEALs, special warfare combatant-craft (SWCC) crewmen, 
combat support and combat service support personnel and civilians which account for less 
than 2 percent of the U.S. Navy and just over 10 percent total of U.S. Special Operations 
Forces (DON, 2018). According to the Naval Special Warfare Publication NWP 3-05, 
NSW’s core operational approach is to 
1. Maintain a readiness posture to respond to crises, contingencies, and war. 
2. Win the trust and confidence of, and building the capacities and 
interoperability with, our coalition, regional, and host nation military 
counterparts. 
3. Engage with interagency counterparts and country teams as part of an 
integrated effort. 
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NSW units rely on a maritime-focused, capabilities-based methodology 
characterized by stealth, dispersed, command and control (C2), and the precise application 
of force to accomplish mission objectives. Through carefully planned and executed actions, 
NSW effectively leverages its relatively small number of personnel and partner 
organizations in support of a broad spectrum of specialized tasks (DON, 2018). 
1. Naval Special Warfare Command Core Activities 
NSW Core Activities are separated into three distinct categories: Primary core 
activities, secondary core activities, and supporting core activities. Core activities are 
defined by the NWP 3-05 as derived from USSOCOM Directive 10–1 and are described 
in the following three subsections using the official definitions found within the DOD 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2021). 
a. Primary Core Activities 
A primary core activity is specific set of tasks that NSW is manned, trained and 
equipped to perform in a denied, hostile or politically sensitive environment which include 
(DON, 2018, pp. 17–18): 
1. Direct Action (DA). “Short-duration strikes and other small-scale 
offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or 
diplomatically sensitive environments which employ specialized military 
capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage 
designated targets.” 
2. Special Reconnaissance (SR). “Reconnaissance and surveillance actions 
conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and /
or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of 
strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not 
normally found in conventional forces.” 
3. Counterinsurgency (COIN). “Comprehensive civilian and military efforts 
designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its 
root causes.” 
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4. Counterterrorism (CT). “Activities and operations taken to neutralize 
terrorist and their organizations and networks to render them incapable of 
using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to 
achieve their goals.” 
5. Security Force Assistance (SFA). “The Department of Defense activities 
that support the deployment of the capacity and capability of foreign 
security forces and their supporting institutions.” 
6. Foreign Internal Defense (FID). “Participation by civilian agencies and 
military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the 
programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to free 
and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, 
and other threats to its security.” 
7. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD). “Efforts against 
actors of concern to curtail the conceptualization, development, 
possession, proliferation, use, and effects of weapons of mass destruction, 
related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery.” 
b. Secondary Core Activities 
A secondary core activity is a set of tasks that NSW has a limited degree of 
organization, manning, training, and equipment to perform in a denied, hostile, and 
politically sensitive environment which include (DON, 2018, pg. 18): 
1. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA). “Department of Defense 
Activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly 
relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.” 
2. Hostage Rescue (HR). “A personnel recovery method used to recover 
isolated personnel who are specifically designated as hostages.” 
3. Unconventional Warfare (UW). “Activities conducted to enable a 
resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a 
8 
government or occupying power by operating through or with an 
underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.” 
c. Supporting Core Activities 
A supporting core activity is a set of tasks that NSW can provide a limited 
supporting capability through the use of existing capabilities (DON, 2018, pg. 18): 
1. Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). “Actions planned, coordinated, executed, 
and assessed to enhance awareness of, and manage the interactions with, 
the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate 
underlying causes of instability within civil society, and/or involve the 
application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of 
civil government.” 
2. Military Information Support Operations (MISO). “Planned operations to 
convey selected information indicators to foreign audiences to influence 
their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior 
of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a 
manner favorable to the originator’s objectives.” 
2. Naval Special Warfare Administrative Organization 
Naval Special Warfare is constituted by of the Naval Special Warfare Command 
(NSWC), six Naval Special Warfare Groups (NSWG) which are comprised of a mix of 
SEAL Teams, a SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team (SDVT), and Special Boat Teams (SBT) as 
well as the Naval Special Warfare Development Group and the Naval Special Warfare 
Training Center and a variety of supporting commands (DON, 2018). 
The following sections provide a high-level overview of the various components. 
For a more detailed explanation, refer to the source material in NWP 3-05. 
a. Naval Special Warfare Command 
The Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) is located in Coronado, California 
and is assigned to the USSOCOM Combatant Command as the Echelon II Commander 
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representing the Maritime Component. NSWC fulfills man, train, and equip (MT&E) 
functions to produce and deploy maritime SOF forces in support of USSOCOM tasking 
(DON, 2018). Figure 1 provides a general overview of NSW. 
 
Figure 1. Naval Special Warfare Organization. Source: United States 
Special Operations Command (2021).  
b. Naval Special Warfare Groups 
A Naval Special Warfare Group is an Echelon III, O5-O6 Command comprised of 
various deployable forces such as SEAL Teams, SDVTs, SBTs and their supporting units. 
NSWG’s exercise ADCON and OPCON and are responsible for the MT&E of assigned 
units. There are currently six NSWGs: NSWG ONE, NSWG TWO, NSWG THREE, 
NSWG FOUR, NSWG TEN and NSWG ELEVEN. 
(1) Naval Special Warfare Group ONE - Coronado, CA 
NSWG ONE serves as the regional coordinator for the provision of NSW support 
to the United States Central Command and the United States Indo-Pacific Command 
(INDOPACOM) Geographic Combatant Commander. Assigned forces include four SEAL 
10 
Teams, one training detachment, one logistics support unit, one mobile communications 
team, and two naval special warfare units. (DON, 2018) 
(2) Naval Special Warfare Group TWO - Little Creek, VA 
NSWG TWO is similar in function to NSWG ONE with the exception that it 
provides NSW support to the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), the United 
States European Command (EUCOM), the United States Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM), and the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Assigned 
forces include four SEAL Teams, one training detachment, one logistics support unit, one 
mobile communications team, and three naval special warfare units. 
(3) Naval Special Warfare Group THREE - Coronado, CA 
NSWG THREE is responsible for the provision of undersea special operations in 
support of worldwide taskings by various entities. Assigned forces include SEAL Delivery 
Vehicle Team 1 stationed at Pearl Harbor, HI, one training detachment, one logistics unit 
and a secondary Group 3 detachment at Little Creek, VA to support East Coast operations. 
(4) Naval Special Warfare Group FOUR - Little Creek, VA 
NSWG FOUR provides rapid maritime surface mobility support for the NSW 
community in the form of various special operations craft capable of operating in open 
ocean, littoral, and riverine environments. Three Special Boat Teams, form the backbone 
of NSWG FOUR which are supported by the Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical 
Training School and the Group 4 Detachment located at the Stennis Space Center in 
Mississippi. 
(5) Naval Special Warfare Group TEN - Little Creek, VA 
NSWG TEN is comprised of two Special Reconnaissance Teams (SRT) and the 
Mission Support Center (MSC). SRTs deploy to provide highly specialized intelligence 
capabilities to SOF and the Joint Force which combines intelligence gathering and 
operational analysis in support of various tasking. Analysts include diverse mix of 
personnel from the special operations, intelligence, METOC, and cryptological 
11 
communities as well as electronics technicians and information systems technicians (DON, 
2018). 
(6) Naval Special Warfare Group ELEVEN - Coronado, CA 
NSWG ELEVEN is the reserve component of NSW responsible for the MT&E and 
mobilization of two subordinate SEAL teams. 
C. OBSERVE, ORIENT, DECIDE, ACT 
The observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop, developed by Air Force Colonel 
John Boyd, is a decision-making approach that focuses on taking available information, 
placing it in context, deciding on a course of action, and then executing that course of action 
as part of a continuous loop. The idea originated from within the context of aerial combat 
where everything was immediate, in the now, and measured in seconds and milliseconds. 
It has since grown to encompass processes and concepts at the operational and strategic 
levels as well as the tactical, the only difference is the matter of time horizons. 
Traditionally, the United States has been very good at observing and acting, but 
continues to develop its ability to orient and decide, especially in light of the deluge of data 
and information generated by modern command and control systems and sensor networks. 
The quicker first and second “O”s are, the more responsive decision-making and acting 
processes are. Theoretically, it is better to avoid tight coupling to support Modular Open 
Systems Architecture (MOSA) which decouples the first “O” from the second. MOSA 
ensures each temporal step or sub-step of the OODA loop is scalable due to its 
independence from adjacent temporal step or sub-step. A visualization of the OODA loop 
can be found in Figure 2. 
12 
 
Figure 2. Boyd’s OODA Loop. Source: Coram (2004). 
D. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Command and control (C2) is defined as “the exercise of authority and direction by 
a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment 
of mission” (JCS, 2017, pg. 15). Commonly misattributed as a technological function, C2 
is actually a combination of two very separate and distinct concepts. These concepts then 
enhanced through the use of technology and specific employment methodologies such as 
mission command (U.S. Marine Corps [USMC], 1996). 
1. Command 
Command can be seen as the “art” portion of command and control which consists 
of a combination of legal authorities and the way by which a commander exercises those 
authorities. It is important to understand the art of command to better understand the 
relative science of control. Simply put, command is the doctrinal assignment of authority 
over subordinates by virtue of position or rank. Authority, responsibility, decision making 
and leadership are the core elements of command (Department of the Army [DA], 2019). 
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a. Authority 
Authority is “the right and power to judge, act, or command” (DA, 2019, pg. 36). 
A key feature of the concept of command is that authority is delegated by law to an 
individual, not a staff or organization. This is the cornerstone by which all other elements 
of command are derived. Authority come in two forms, legal and personal. As previously 
stated, legal authority is delegated to an individual by a superior as provided for by law or 
regulation. Personal authority is in large part based on interpersonal relationships, trust, 
and confidence in the actions of the commander. With due consideration for ability and 
competence, authority may be delegated to subordinates in the execution of duties 
assigned, however the commander remains accountable for any successes, failures, and 
decisions made in their name. 
b. Responsibility 
Responsibility, on the other hand can be viewed as the commander’s legal and 
ethical accountability for his/her action or inaction as well as those of his/her subordinates 
(DA, 2019). Unlike authority, responsibility and accountability cannot be delegated. 
c. Decision Making 
Decision Making is the application of the commander’s understanding of the art 
and science of war to determine a course of action for a given situation. Often faced with 
imperfect information, commanders must rely on their skill and experience to make the 
best decision for a given situation in a timely manner. “Striking the balance between acting 
now with imperfect information and acting later with better information is essential to the 
art of command” (DA, 2019, pg. 37). Key to decision making is the concept of 
understanding which is exemplified by the four levels of meaning for decision making as 
shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Four Levels of Meaning for Decision Making. Source: DA 
(2019). 
Effective decision making relies on an understanding of the operational 
environment or situation. Situational understanding is “the product of applying analysis 
and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the operational 
and mission variables” (DA, 2019, pg. 37). In the context of decision making, 
understanding is the end result of the data, information, knowledge chain. 
(1) Data 
Data is “unprocessed observations detected by a collector of any kind” (DA, 2019, 
pg. 98). Data can be generated by a number of sources including human intelligence, 
sensors, and simulations. Typically, data in its raw form has limited usefulness to a 
commander without further processing as it lacks context and meaning. 
(2) Information 
Information is “data that has been organized and processed in order to provide 
context for further analysis” (DA, 2019, pg. 99). For example, a group of sensors could be 
placed to collect similar data points across a geographic location. This data becomes 
information when it has been analyzed, labeled, categorized, displayed, or otherwise placed 
in the context of the operational environment. 
Information quality is a key requirement for effective decision making and is 
described by the Joint Communications Publication JP 6-0 as having the following seven 
elements (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2019): 
1. Accuracy. Provides a true representation of a given event or situation that 
is correct and precise to level required. 
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2. Relevance. Possesses the quality or state of being appropriate and 
applicable to a given situation. 
3. Timeliness. Information is available in time to affect the decision-making 
process. 
4. Usability. Presented in a way that provides benefit to a user within a given 
context which facilitate understanding or further analysis using common 
formats. 
5. Completeness. The state or condition of having all information relevant to 
making a decision. 
6. Brevity. Information that has only the level of detail required, concise. 
7. Security. Confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
Information can take a variety of forms including a single plot on a common 
operational picture (COP) system, an entry in a report representing the relative strength 
and composition of a specific or group of units, environmental conditions of a certain 
location and so on. 
(3) Knowledge 
Knowledge is “information that has been analyzed and evaluated for operational 
implications.” (DA, 2019, pg. 99). Knowledge can exist in two forms, tacit and explicit. 
Tacit knowledge resides within the mind, is largely based on personal experience, training, 
and skill and cannot be easily imparted on another individual or transferred to an electronic 
or written medium. Explicit knowledge on the other hand can be expressed in many forms 
including doctrine, visualization tools, databases, and so on. For the purposes of C2, 
knowledge can most easily be understood as information that imparts relevant meaning 
when placed in the context of a situation or operational environment. 
(4) Understanding 
The concept of understanding is “knowledge that has been synthesized and had 
judgment applied” (DA, 2019, pg. 100) to comprehend the relationships of an operational 
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environment. Understanding is the culmination of data, information and knowledge that 
allows a commander to achieve situational awareness (SA) sufficient to make a decision 
based on relevant information within an operationally relevant timeline. 
d. Leadership 
Finally, leadership is the “activity of influencing people by providing purpose, 
direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization” (DA, 
2019, pg. 44). While certainly not all-inclusive, leadership within the context of C2 can be 
summed up as the ability of a commander to achieve understanding of the operational 
environment, effectively make and convey decisions to subordinates based on the 
information available, and ensure unity of effort in the execution of those decisions. 
2. Control 
Control is the ability “to manage and direct forces and functions consistent with a 
commander’s command authority” (JCS, 2017, pg. 58). Once a commander has determined 
a course of action, control is employed in order to meet commander’s intent. Control is 
largely data driven and relies heavily on the objective analysis of the capabilities and 
limitations of both friendly and hostile forces in a dynamic environment to appropriately 
employ forces. The core elements of control can be defined as direction, feedback, 
information, and communication and are reciprocal in nature as shown in Figure 4 (DA, 
2019). 
 
Figure 4. The Reciprocal Nature of Control. Source: DA (2019). 
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a. Direction 
Direction means to “communicate information related to a decision that initiates 
and governs actions of subordinate and supporting units” (DA, 2019, pg. 62). This is 
typically accomplished through the use of plans and orders and can best be understood 
using the example of a five part situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, 
command and signal (SMEAC) format as described in the Marine Corps Planning Process 
MCWP 5-10 (US Marine Corps [USMC], 2017): 
1. Situation. Describes the commander’s overall understanding of the 
operational environment to include the area of operations, adversarial 
forces, friendly forces, disposition of the population, assumptions, and 
legal considerations. 
2. Mission. Purpose of the operation. Provides the who, what, where, when, 
why, and as much of how as necessary to ensure command, control, and 
coordination. 
3. Execution. Provides commander’s intent, concept of operations, explicit 
tasks, reserve forces, commander’s critical information requirements 
(CCIR), and coordinating instructions. 
4. Administration and Logistics. Sets requirements for personnel 
management, transportation, provisioning, and all related sustainment 
activities. 
5. Command and Signal. Establishes command relationships, locations of 
command posts and headquarters, and provides a high-level overview of 
communications requirements. 
b. Feedback 
Feedback is essentially the reciprocal function of “direct” which includes the 
information that is fed back to the commander which enables him/her to track the progress 
of an operation and make any required adjustments as the understanding of a situation 
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evolves. Feedback is critical for identifying possible issues and opportunities in a dynamic 
and ever-changing environment. 
c. Operational Information 
Operational information is quite literally the lifeblood that feeds all other elements 
of C2. Information can come from many different sources and can vary greatly in quality, 
relevance, and latency. As Carl von Clausewitz famously observed “Many intelligence 
reports in war are contradictory; even more are false; and most are uncertain…reports turn 
out to be lies, exaggerations, errors, and so on” (Clausewitz, 2006, pg. 64). For the purposes 
of C2, information can be divided into operational and mission variables. 
Operational variables are those variables used to develop an understanding of the 
overall operational environment. ADP 6–0 describes operational variables in the form of 
the mnemonic “PMESII-PT” which stands for political, military, economic, social, 
information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time as shown in Table 1. 




Mission variables are more focused on a specific area of operations and often 
represent data at a more specific or granular level. A brief summary of some possible 
mission variables can be found in Table 2. 
Table 2. Mission Variables. Source: DA (2019). 
 
 
Given that operational variables tend to be used at the operational level while 
mission variables tend to have more relevance at the tactical level, it is important to note 
that these two are not mutually exclusive. In fact, a tactical unit that has a good 
understanding of the overall operational environment is arguably in a better position to 
meet commander’s intent in the event opportunity or adversity presents itself. Likewise, 
there are times that an operational planner would benefit from more specific information 
provided by mission variables. 
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One should be aware that more information is not always better. Analysis paralysis 
is a common issue that can occur as the amount of available information exceeds the ability 
to effectively processes it. Further, the act of seeking information can lead to undesirable 
consequences. For example, excessive requests for information (RFI) or onerous reporting 
requirements can create inefficiencies within both superior and subordinate units. In this 
situation, processes may be duplicated or irrelevant information may be presented which 
negatively affects the commander’s exercise of effective C2. A thorough understanding of 
the relationship among data, information, knowledge, and understanding as well as the 
ways these elements are obtained is essential to understanding the “information” portion 
of control. 
(1) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements 
One way to overcome excessive reporting requirements is through the use of 
commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) which are defined as the “elements 
of friendly and enemy information the commander identifies as critical to timely decision 
making” (JCS, 2017, pg. 47). CCIRs accomplish two primary functions. First, CCIRs are 
used to provide the commander with understanding of the operational environment. 
Second, they assist the commander in the decision-making process by linking CCIRs with 
decision points (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2020a). A general overview of the CCIR 
process is shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. The Commander’s Critical Information Requirements 
Process Source: JCS (2020a). 
Properly defined CCIRs can help to optimize the allocation of collection resources, 
as well as limit the type and volume of information reported to that which has been deemed 
relevant to the commander. Any additional information required by the commander must 
generally be obtained through an RFI process. 
For example, an operational commander might not find the movement of an 
individual hostile infantry unit relevant unless it presents a risk to the overall mission. 
Conversely, a tactical commander may find the same movement extremely relevant as it 
could directly impact an action for which he/she is responsible. In this situation, the tactical 
commander may determine individual unit movements are a CCIR and require subordinate 
reporting, whereas the operational commander may determine that individual unit 
movements only meet CCIR if it poses a certain level risk, e.g., an anti-aircraft battery 
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moving into a position which presents a new threat to the ingress and egress of friendly 
forces. 
Once approved by a commander, CCIRs are generally integrated into the staff’s 
watch standing function which then ingests various reports and assesses their applicability 
to CCIR requirements. The entire process can be tedious and often requires a watch to 
spend an inordinate time and attention in an effort to sort through incoming information. 
This could further contribute to an overall increase in cognitive load which could lead to a 
loss of situational awareness as an individual is overwhelmed by the volume of incoming 
information (Clarke & Knudson, 2018). Recent data processing advances suggest that 
digitizing CCIRs might result in automated agents which could provide watch standers 
proactive CCIR alerts, decreasing their cognitive load. 
(2) Priority and Friendly Force Information Requirements 
CCIRs are further classified into priority information requirements (PIR) and 
friendly force information requirements (FFIR). A PIR is defined as “an intelligence 
requirement that the commander and staff need to understand the threat and other aspects 
of the operational environment” (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2013, pg. 26) and are most 
commonly associated with information regarding enemy forces or other characteristics of 
the operational environment (DA, 2019). A subset of PIRs are essential elements of 
information (EEI) which are “the most critical information requirements regarding the 
adversary and the operational area needed by the commander to assist in reaching a 
decision” (JCS, 2013, pg. 26). 
(3) Friendly Force Information Requirements 
FFIRs, on the other hand, is “information a commander and staff need to understand 
the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities” (JCS, 2017, pg. 214). This can 
include items such as disposition, location, and strength of friendly forces relevant to the 
commander’s decision-making process. Another crucial factor is the logistic status of 
various forces, especially fuel and weapons. 
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(4) Request for Information 
Requests for information are “any specific time-sensitive ad-hoc requirement for 
intelligence information or products to support an ongoing crisis or operation not 
necessarily related to standing requirements or scheduled intelligence [or operational] 
production” (JCS, 2013, pg. 141). RFI processes can be either formal or informal in nature 
and tend to vary greatly by command or location. A formal RFI is submitted to a supporting 
command for a number of reasons including a formal request for review of a certain plan 
or document, or to solicit the generation of a product. Formal RFIs typically utilize a system 
or process which documents the official issuance, receipt, and response to the request from 
one organization to another. As the name implies, an informal RFI is less structured and 
often takes place “behind-the-scenes” via email, telcons or other forms of personal 
communications. The RFI process can be a powerful tool for gathering information, but 
can also place undue burden on a staff if used too frequently which could result in 
undesirable outcomes such as inefficiency or a loss of initiative due to perceived 
micromanagement. 
d. Communication 
A core function of command and control is communication. Not to be confused 
with communication systems, communication within the context of C2 can be defined as 
the process of exchanging information via various methods to facilitate the collection, 
dissemination, collaboration, and sharing of information and ideas to develop a common 
understanding in support of planning and execution. Per the ADP 6–0, “Communication 
links information to decisions and decisions to action” (DA, 2019, pg. 66). Communication 
can take place in many forms including verbal, nonverbal, and written, which are further 
enabled through the use of technology, specifically communications and command and 
control systems. 
E. MISSION COMMAND 
Mission command is defined as the “conduct of military operations through 
decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders” (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 
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2018, pg. 11). As the definition implies, it is built on a philosophy of centralized command 
coupled with decentralized control and execution. 
Perceived by some as a relatively new term, mission command has a deeply rooted 
tradition within the maritime domain. Historically, naval commanders were given great 
latitude to exercise discretion in the furtherance of operational objectives due to the great 
distances involved and relative inability to “reach back” to higher headquarters for 
guidance. Perhaps one of the best-known sentiments of mission command is the famous 
quote by Admiral Horatio Nelson in an address to his commanders on the eve of the Battle 
of Trafalgar where he said, “in case signals can neither be seen or perfectly understood, no 
Captain can do very wrong if he places his Ship alongside that of the enemy.” This 
declaration captures the essence of mission command by simplifying his operational intent 
into a single, concise statement.  
Fast-forward to the present day, where despite advances in communications and C2 
systems across the joint force, the proliferation of communications-denial capabilities 
threatens the ability to maintain robust, reliable C2 networks. Such a loss could result in 
the inability of a commander to maintain the same level of control previously enjoyed in a 
more permissive environment, necessitating the need for a mission command approach. 
At its core, mission command seeks to exploit the “human element” which requires 
a thorough understanding of the commander’s intent coupled with the disciplined initiative 
of subordinate commanders to accomplish mission objectives (JCS, 2020). Of note, care 
must be taken to ensure decision making is maintained at the appropriate level and not 
simply delegated to the front-line commander. For this, mission command can be broken 
down into seven principles: Competence, mutual trust, shared understanding, mission 
orders, commander’s intent, disciplined initiative, and risk acceptance (Townsend et al., 
2019). 
1. Competence 
Competence is foundational for the proper employment of mission command. 
Education, experience, and training play key roles in the professional development of a 
force capable operating at the highest levels of tactical and technical proficiency. 
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Competence can be expressed in many ways, but for the purposes of mission command, it 
comes down to ability of a servicemember to understand his/her taskings and to properly 
execute assigned tasks. 
2. Mutual Trust 
Mutual trust is “shared confidence between commanders, subordinates, and 
partners that they can be relied on and are competent in performing their assigned tasks” 
(DA, 2019, pg. 19). Trust is crucial to the chain of command in that a commander must 
have faith in the ability of his/her subordinates to execute in accordance with instructions. 
This enables them to then delegate accordingly, based on past performance and their 
perceived ability to execute in the future. Of course, trust is not, and should not be given 
by default. Discretion must be exercised, and trust given on the basis of demonstrated 
ability commensurate with the level of responsibility to be placed on the subordinate. For 
example, one may trust an E-5 to lead a platoon on a routine patrol, however the same E-5 
may not be capable of overseeing a multi-platoon operation without further training and 
experience. Trust is developed over time through consistent performance and the 
demonstration of sound judgment. Similarly, a commander must also work to gain the trust 
of his/her subordinates. While commanders generally enjoy a baseline level of trust by 
virtue of their position, they too must develop trust over time. Trust among superiors and 
subordinates as well as between various organizations based on a common understanding 
of the operational environment and mission objectives greatly enhances the effectiveness 
of an organization. 
3. Shared Understanding 
Per the ADP 6–0, “A critical challenge for commanders, staffs, and unified action 
partners is creating shared understanding of an operational environment, an operation’s 
purpose, problems, and approaches to solving problems” (DA, 2019, pg. 20). Shared 
understanding relies on common training, vocabulary, doctrine, and information to achieve 
a baseline level of knowledge to enable collaboration, planning and operations. A visual 
representation of shared understanding is shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Building Shared Understanding. Source: JCS (2017). 
Additionally, the concept of shared understanding can be further divided into 
situational awareness and situational understanding. Situational awareness is a perception 
of facts relevant to a given circumstance which provides the individual with a sense of 
“what” is happening (Hill & Niemi, 2017). Situational understanding answers the questions 
of “so what?” and “now what?” by applying judgment, in the form of insight, foresight, 
and critical analysis to achieve awareness of the context, consequences and implications of 
an event (Lovering, 2014). A more detailed visualization of the relationship between 
situational awareness and situational understanding is shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Situational Awareness to Situational Understanding. 
Source: Lovering (2014) 
Implicit in this model is that each level of awareness builds upon the next. Lack of 
quality, granularity, or depth will reduce the overall level of understanding one can achieve 
within a given context. While professional development, education, and competence can 
vary widely from person to person, technology continues to play an increasingly vital role 
in the creation, analysis, and distribution of knowledge in support of shared understanding. 
4. Mission Orders 
Mission orders are directives that provide clear guidance on a desired result or end-
state, not specifics on how to attain or achieve those objectives. Mission orders support the 
core element of “direction” of the concept of control. Competence, shared understanding, 
and mutual trust play key roles in the development on mission orders. As previously 
discussed, the situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and command 
and signal (SMEAC) format provides a useful method for conveying mission-type orders 
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to subordinate units, however units can also receive mission orders across a range of formal 
and informal mediums. 
The key to effective mission orders is to provide enough detail to achieve a common 
understanding of the operational environment, mission objectives, constraints (must do), 
restraints (can’t do), logistics, available, communications links, reporting requirements, 
organization, and command relationships, to enable subordinate activity and initiative but 
not so much detail that it unduly stifles a subordinate’s ability to exercise his/her own 
command authority and freedom of action. 
Due consideration must be given to various elements including the nature of the 
operation, associated strategic and political concerns, as well as the anticipated availability 
of communications, and the ability of a subordinates to make informed decisions based on 
their level of situational understanding (Hill & Niemi, 2017). For example, routine 
boarding operations in the Arabian Gulf may permit a commander to grant a higher level 
of autonomy to a subordinate than could be given to the leader of a direct-action mission 
within a hostile or otherwise politically sensitive area (e.g., Operation Neptune Spear) 
where the front-line commander may not have knowledge of all the pieces in play or the 
strategic implications of his or her decisions. 
5. Commander’s Intent 
Commander’s intent is a “clear and concise expression of what the force must do 
and the conditions the force must establish to accomplish mission” (JCS, 2017, pg. 211). 
While there is no agreed upon requirements for commander’s intent, it generally includes 
statements of purpose, method, risk, and end-state. This allows staffs and subordinate 
commands to focus their efforts through insight into a commander’s line of thinking to 
enable initiative and decision making without further orders in the event an operation does 
not progress as planned. And since no plan survives contact with the enemy intact, it is 
critical to understand what to do when the circumstances change. 
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6. Disciplined Initiative 
Disciplined Initiative is “the duty individual subordinates have to exercise initiative 
within the constraints of the commander’s intent to achieve the desired end state” (DA, 
2019, pg. 24). Essentially, a subordinate is expected to execute in accordance with the plan, 
until evolving circumstances require a change or an opportunity presents itself to further 
mission objectives in accordance with commander’s intent. 
7. Risk Acceptance 
Risk acceptance is the end result of the risk management process which seeks to 
“identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission 
benefits” (JCS, 2021, pg. 193). Due to the nature of military operations in a dynamic 
environment, risk is always present as a result of both anticipated and unanticipated actions 
by the enemy, friendly forces, or even third parties. In the context of mission command, a 
commander must be prepared to accept a certain level of risk and effectively convey this 
tolerance to subordinate commands. A prime example of the concept of risk acceptance is 
the letter of instruction by Fleet Admiral Nimitz issued concerning the defense of Midway: 
In carrying out the task assigned in Op Plan 29–42, you will be governed 
by the principle of calculated risk, which you will interpret to mean the 
avoidance of exposure of your force to attack by superior enemy forces 
without good prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater 
damage to the enemy. (Rubel, 2015, pg. 2) 
With this single statement, Nimitz demonstrated confidence in his operational 
commanders’ ability to execute the plan while simultaneously empowering them to make 
calculated risks in accordance with his level of risk tolerance. 
F. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Command and control systems are a specific type of communications system used 
to collect, process, store, disseminate, and manage information and facilitates the direction, 
feedback, information, and communication functions for a designated commander over 
assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of mission the exercise of authority 
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and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the 
accomplishment of mission. 
The Joint Communications System (JP 6-0) outlines the following eight functions 
for communications systems (JCS, 2019, pg. 28): 
1. Acquire: “The introduction of information into the communications 
system.” 
2. Process: “A specified sequence of operations performed on well-defined 
inputs to produce a specified output.” 
3. Store: “The retention, organization, and disposition of data, information, 
or knowledge to facilitate sharing and retrieval.” 
4. Transport: “End-to-end information exchange and dissemination in a 
global environment.” 
5. Control: “The function of directing, monitoring, and regulating 
communications system functions to fulfill operational requirements 
within specific performance parameters.” 
6. Protect: “Information integrity, secure processing, and transmission with 
access only by authorized personnel.” 
7. Disseminate: “Distribution of processed information to the appropriate 
users.” 
8. Presentation: “Information provided to the user in the method that best 
facilitates understanding and use.” 
Naval C2 systems are broadly defined by PEO C4I PMW 150 as maritime, tactical 
and support C2. 
1. Maritime Command and Control 
Maritime systems enable situational awareness and provide a common operational 
picture for planning and coordination of afloat forces. The Navy’s C2 program of record 
(POR) C2 system is the Global Command and Control System, Maritime (GCCS-M). 
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GCCS-M provides near real-time situational awareness and blue-force tracking of the 
maritime domain. GCCS-M is a legacy system that facilitates the exchange of data and 
information between more than 75 Navy and joint command, control, computers, 
communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C5ISR) systems 
which is then processed to produce a common operational picture. First fielded in 1998, 
GCCS-M has demonstrated great success in providing commanders at all levels with a 
single, integrated, scalable C2 capability. However, GCCS-M has struggled to keep pace 
with recent technological advances. Limited by its specialized hardware and software 
architecture, GCCS has been unable to capitalize on opportunities presented by modern 
artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) techniques, distributed storage 
methods, and processing power. Further, GCCS requires a significant amount of manual 
human intervention to maintain communications channels, manage databases, and 
correlate track data from various sources (Wilson et al., 2016). 
The Maritime Tactical Command and Control (MTC2) is a relatively new C2 
system which provides battle management aids (BMA) in an effort to “dynamically plan, 
assess, monitor and execute Distributed Maritime Operations” (Lo, 2021, pg. 9). The 
overall goal of MTC2 is to synchronize various planning process functions across the unit, 
strike group and fleet level. Initial decision aid capabilities focus on scheme of maneuver, 
schedule of events, representation of the operational environment, and force status 
reporting. Additional functionality is provided using a DevSecOps pipeline to rapidly 
develop, test, and field incremental capability-based improvements. The system is 
designed to be “hardware agnostic” and able to operate on standard Navy enterprise 
networks such as the Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) and 
the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) (Lo, 2021). 
Additional C2 systems include the naval adaptations of the Army Joint Automated 
Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS) which supports time sensitive targeting, 
maritime dynamic targeting, and coordinates fires across all phases of the joint targeting 
cycle and the U.S. Air Force’s Theater Battle Management Core System used to generate 
the joint air tasking order (Lo, 2021). 
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2. Tactical Command and Control 
Tactical command and control (TAC C2) systems focus on achieving battlespace 
awareness through “the effective use of digital communications and data processing 
technologies, data links, and track data” (Rutledge, 2021, pg. 3). 
As shown in Figure 8, data links are created among the various units using a 
combination of satellite, line-of-sight, and beyond line-of-sight transmission mediums. 
Individual platforms employ organic sensors to produce tracks which are then transmitted 
to other units in the link to extend the operational picture or for further correlation and 
consolidation by a Joint or Maritime C2 System. 
 
Figure 8. Tactical Data Links, OV1. Source: PMW 150 (2021). 
Tactical C2 systems include tactical data links such as Link 11, Link 16, and Link 
22 and the systems that manage them including the Link Management Monitoring Tool 
(LMMT) the Command and Control Processor (C2P), and the Air Defense Systems 
Integrator (ADSI). 
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3. Support Command and Control 
Support command and control (SUP C2) is essentially a collection of business 
logistics systems which provide a range of supply, accounting, records management, and 
material readiness capabilities to the warfighter. Three example of SUP C2 systems are the 
Naval Tactical Command Support System (NTCSS), the Naval Aviation Logistics 
Command Information System (NALCOMIS) and the Standard Accounting, Budgeting, 
and Reporting System (SABRS) Management Analysis Retrieval Tools System 
(SMARTS). 
4. Additional C2 Systems 
C2 systems in support of Naval Special Warfare vary by geographic location based 
on the requirements of the respective theater special operations command (TSOC). Specific 
systems include the Global Command and Control System – Joint (GCCS-J), the Combined 
Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE), the Deployable Common Ground System-
SOF (DCGS-SOF), and the Automated Information Discovery Environment (AIDE). 
GCCS-J is similar to GCCS-M except that it serves as the DOD’s joint C2 system 
of record. GCCS-J is the primary C2 system used by geographic combatant commanders 
(GCC), joint task force commanders, TSOCs, and subordinate commands to in support of 
joint and coalition operations (Defense Information Systems Agency, 2018). 
DCGS-SOF is an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) system used 
to provide planning, direction, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination 
functions in support of SOF operations at the operational and tactical level. The DCGS-
SOF system is able to task, control, and collect data from multiple platforms including the 
RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-1 Predator, and organic capabilities. This data can then be fused 
with feeds from the intelligence community and other sources to provide timely, 
actionable, all-source intelligence products for SOF units and mission partners (United 
States Special Operations Command, 2014). 
CIDNE is a C2 system which processes information about people, facilities, and 
organizations to track spheres of influence within region. Initially developed by the U.S. 
Army in conjunction with CENTCOM for managing contacts with high level personnel, 
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but later found success in counter improvised explosive device (IED) operations (Vassiliou 
et al., 2011). CIDNE is currently used by the Special Operations Command, Pacific 
(SOCPAC) to receive and distribute mission reports which can be correlated with GCCS-
J tracks to provide additional context and a more wholistic view to the common operating 
picture. 
Finally, the AIDE is an all-domain command and control system used to process, 
exploit, integrate and disseminate information. AIDE applications provide red and blue 
force tracking, medical, visualization, and workflow services in a real-time environment. 
Special features are global storage with real-time distribution, cross-domain information 
sharing, AI/ML object detection and characterization, text translation and operations, 
intelligence, medical and logistics integration (Novetta, 2020). 
5. Command and Control System Concerns 
Despite tremendous advantages derived from current C2 systems, their continued 
reliance on specialized hardware, software, and data structures developed by multiple 
vendors and services, cause significant problems with interoperability, data silos, and 
cross-domain solutions. Interoperability is defined as the ability of a system or application 
to exchange and make use of information with another system or application. Differences 
in equipment, implementations of standards, or even operational procedures can result in a 
failure to communicate critical information over designated C2 channels. 
A data silo occurs when information is isolated within a certain system due to 
process or technological barriers. For example, a modern radar system produces an 
enormous amount of data (position, altitude, bearing, speed, direction, signal quality, time, 
etc.) for all contacts which are processed and evaluated locally to identify contacts which 
meet specific criteria relevant to the context of the situation. Contacts that are considered 
relevant are turned into tracks and pushed out over the link to other units. Those that do 
not meet threshold criteria are usually discarded or stored locally. Data silos can also occur 
due to a process or reporting format, e.g., an intelligence report which provides detailed 
information on an event but is not machine readable precluding any opportunity to conduct 
advanced historical, operational, or pattern of life analysis techniques. Non-interoperability 
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issues at the knowledge and understanding ladders of a pyramid are due to a lack of context 
and common understanding of a meaning of entities and events. 
Security classification plays a key role in the ability to effectively share 
information. Typically, naval C2 is executed at the SECRET level which can prove 
problematic when attempting to coordinate with joint or multinational partners. To 
illustrate this point, during a recent presentation at the Naval Postgraduate School, the 
USSOCOM Commander remarked that he has four computers (unclassified, secret, top 
secret, and international) on his desk alone which he must constantly monitor in order to 
maintain situational awareness. 
The current generation of cross-domain solutions and declassification processes are 
extremely tedious and limited in their ability to facilitate communications across 
classification levels regardless of the actual classification of the information. Further, 
information can sometimes be classified at a higher level than otherwise warranted due to 
the default classification level of the sensor or method of collection. 
G. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
Several emerging technologies suggest that changes to how command and control 
will be conducted or supported may change in the near future. Four emerging technologies 
may force adaptions for the NSW approach to command and control. 
1. Unmanned Systems 
Sometimes called autonomous systems, unmanned systems are aerial, ground, and 
submersible platforms designed to perform tasks with little to no human intervention. Often 
used to perform jobs deemed dull, dirty, dangerous, or distant, unmanned systems have 
grown increasingly important in the NSW community as a force-multiplier to augment a 
traditionally small group of highly skilled professionals. Unmanned systems can support a 
number of Joint Capability Areas including Force Battlespace Awareness, Force 
Application, and Logistics (Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2018a). 
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a. Battlespace Awareness 
Battlespace Awareness, as previously discussed, is the use of sensors and data links 
to develop situational awareness within a given domain. Future unmanned systems will 
continue to improve our ability to gain knowledge and understanding of the operational 
environment by producing increasingly detailed information at an exponential rate. 
Currently, the vast majority of the information produced by unmanned sensor networks is 
discarded or otherwise inaccessible for further analysis which misses a tremendous 
opportunity for the extraction, categorization, and exploitation in support of timely, 
relevant, comprehensive, and accurate decision-making processes. In addition to sensors, 
unmanned systems can be utilized to field rapid, ad-hoc communications capabilities to an 
operational area if existing capability is compromised or otherwise unavailable. 
b. Force Application 
Force application is supported through the use of an unmanned system to deliver a 
kinetic or non-kinetic effect. Kinetic effects include the employment of ordnance or 
munitions to disable or destroy a given target. Non-kinetic effects include various less-
than-lethal capabilities such as radio-frequency jamming. Inherent in force application is 
the concept of the kill-chain, and how to exercise C2 throughout the joint targeting cycle 
to effectively match missions of shooters-to-targets. 
c. Logistics 
Sometimes overlooked is growing potential for unmanned systems in military 
logistics. Over the past ten years, the Department of Defense has invested heavily in 
unmanned transportation which provides a safer, more reliable, less human intensive 
alternative to traditional means of delivery. One successful program was the United States 
Marine Corps’ K-MAX unmanned autonomous cargo helicopter which conducted 
approximately 1,730 resupply missions across Afghanistan to deliver over four million 
pounds of supplies (Haddick, 2016). 
In the maritime domain, the U.S. Navy testing a high-endurance, multi-mission 
underwater submersible known as the Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle 
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(LDUUV). The LDUUV can be deployed from a host submarine and features 
reconfigurable payloads which can provide a covert option for the automated delivery of 
supplies to rendezvous with SOF elements at a pre-determined location. Another intriguing 
method of delivery is the use of micro unmanned aerial vehicles to “deliver high-value 
items such as medical supplies, vaccines, cash…to deliver routine supply classes to combat 
outposts, patrols, and remote guerilla and SOF operator sites” (Haddick, 2016, pg. 28). 
2. Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning 
With the exponential explosion in data, communications, and processing power 
since the turn of the century, artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) have 
become nearly ubiquitous across a range of industries including healthcare, agriculture, 
retail, education, finance, research, logistics and is becoming increasingly prevalent in the 
defense sector. The 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy defines 
artificial intelligence as “the ability of machines to perform tasks that normally require 
human intelligence” (Department of Defense [DOD], 2018, pg. 5) such as perception, 
cognition, reasoning, and decision making. ML is a subset of AI which uses automated 
techniques that allow systems to learn from a given dataset, identify patterns, and make 
decisions with minimal human intervention. 
a. Three Waves of Artificial Intelligence 
The Department of Defense has been a strong supporter of AI/ML research and 
development, most notably through a number of research initiatives led by the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) beginning in 1958. DARPA’s leadership 
ushered in a “golden age” of AI research which led to the establishment of AI as a formal 
discipline. This laid the foundation for tech giants such as Amazon, Google, Facebook, and 
Microsoft to develop commercial products across a wide range of industries including 
healthcare, agriculture, retail, education, financial services, marketing, research, and 
logistics. DARPA has described AI as occurring in three separate waves: Handcrafted 
Knowledge, Statistical Learning, and Contextual Adaptation (Launchbury, 2017). 
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(1) Handcrafted Knowledge 
Handcrafted knowledge is based on rulesets created by engineers which represent 
knowledge in well-defined domains (Launchbury, 2017). First wave AI systems excel in 
logical reasoning over narrowly-defined problem sets. The “Cyber Grand Challenge” is an 
example of leveraging first wave principles to identify vulnerabilities to be exploited or 
defended against using rule-based analysis in a cyber environment. Similar concepts could 
be used to support military operations in a number of capacities including operations, 
planning, and logistics. The principal drawback of a first wave system is that it cannot 
adapt or learn on its own and must be programmed by a human operator to achieve desired 
functionality. 
(2) Statistical Learning 
Statistical learning refers to the use of statistical models created for clearly defined 
problems and then trained using extremely large datasets. Also known as ML, second wave 
systems are currently the most popular form of AI in use and are characterized by their 
ability to make associations through the use of supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement 
learning techniques. Second wave AI systems specialize in perceiving and classifying data, 
but suffer from a lack of context which limits their ability to reason and provide causal 
insight which can sometimes lead to erroneous errors that are expressed with a high degree 
of confidence. DARPA and other organizations are currently investing heavily in statistical 
learning systems that provide new capabilities to the warfighter such as the ability to 
observe and track global cyber-attacks in real time, manage spectrum usage in increasingly 
congested environments, and to train and operate autonomous vehicles (Launchbury, 
2017). 
(3) Contextual Adaptation 
The third wave of AI is contextual adaptation which seeks to build explanatory 
models to describe and eventually predict real-world phenomena (Launchbury, 2017). 
Third wave systems are built using a contextual model which organizes data not only by 
specific datapoints, but also by additional attributes which govern how it relates and 
interacts with other data. These systems use a combination of first wave and second wave 
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principles to learn about their environments over time and then apply that knowledge to 
further refine their base model to gain additional insight. 
b. DOD Implementation of Artificial Intelligence 
The DOD established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) in response to 
the 2017 National Security Strategy which directed agencies to prioritize emerging 
technologies to modernize key capabilities. The JAIC quickly published the Defense 
Artificial Intelligence Strategy to formalize a set of initiatives which focus on rapidly 
incorporating AI in an iterative, responsible manner to enhance the decision-making 
process within key domains (DOD, 2019). The five initiatives are as follows: 
1. Deliver AI-enabled capabilities that address key missions. 
2. Scale AI’s impact across DOD through a common foundation that enables 
decentralized development and experimentation.  
3. Cultivate a leading AI workforce.  
4. Engage with commercial, academic, and international allies and partners. 
5. Lead in military ethics and AI safety. 
Each initiative represents a monumental undertaking, however, none of this will be 
possible without first establishing the common foundation which includes establishing 
repositories of “shared data, reusable tools, frameworks and standards, and cloud and edge 
services” (DOD, 2019, pg. 7). In a 2020 article, the JAIC explained that much of the data 
required for the implementation of AI is either not collected, or not stored in a format or 
location for optimal use (Joint Artificial Intelligence Center [JAIC], 2020), which 
reemphasizes the previous discussion regarding data siloes. 
Often, organizations seek outside assistance to build an AI application only to find 
out that they do not have the data required for success. The JAIC Joint Warfighting 
Operations mission lead recently observed “we are tasked with delivering AI capabilities. 
However, for my team to do that, the force has to meet us part of the way by getting 
themselves AI-Ready” (JAIC, 2020a, paragraph 2). 
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To assist, JAIC created a framework which guides service components on ways to 
prepare their organizations for the integration of AI. This can be achieved through taking 
steps such as saving data that was previously discarded, standardizing existing data and 
storing it with similar types, curating and normalizing databases, and cataloguing existing 
data repositories. Further, new opportunities for data collection should be explored (e.g., 
data from biometric monitoring devices) to build a historical dataset relevant to the 
organization. In addition, investments should be made in network, computer, and 
communications infrastructures that are capable of supporting AI applications (JAIC, 
2020a). Additional items for NSW consideration are the use of open architectures, as well 
as understanding and documenting an organization’s processes and workflows. 
According to the JAIC, four key questions must be answered when considering data 
requirements (JAIC, 2020, paragraph 4): 
1. What mission challenges are you trying to solve with the large datasets 
you are bringing into the Joint Common Foundation? 
2. What are the intended and potential use cases? 
3. What other data do you plan to use and why? 
4. What will be the cost to prepare your data for use in AI/ML development? 
USSOCOM has taken concrete steps to develop AI/ML and other cutting-edge data 
techniques with the commissioning of a data engineering lab in Tampa, Florida. Located 
at the SOFWERX facility, SOCOM is partnering with industry leaders and academic 
institutions such as Carnegie Mellon University to build a culture that is conducive to 
embracing state-of-the-art data technologies to address specific problem sets to generate 
options in support of Joint Force operations. 
Ultimately, accurate, well-structured training data sets that are compatible with 
USSOCOM architectures are essential to further the development of NSW data-driven 
capabilities such as Digital Mission Command and SOF Connect. Acquiring data after-the-
fact is difficult, which means NSW must begin to identify the data they currently have, the 
data they currently need, and data they may need in the future. 
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3. Cloud Technology 
According to the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) cloud 
implementation is separated into the two broad categories of Deployment and Service 
Models. 
a. Cloud Deployment Methods 
The first is the overall cloud deployment method which is characterized by a 
combination of the location of the cloud infrastructure relative to the intended user base. 
Cloud deployment methods can be public, private, or hybrid (Mell & Grance, 2011). 
• Public cloud: Infrastructure provisioned for use by the general public and 
exists on the premises of the cloud provider. 
• Private cloud: Infrastructure provisioned for exclusive use by a single 
organization which may be owned, managed, and operated by the 
organization or a third party. Private clouds may exist either on or off of 
the premises of the organization. 
• Hybrid cloud: Cloud infrastructure comprised of a combination of public 
and private clouds. This is normally done to provide for cloud-bursting 
capability, or to satisfy legal or security requirements. 
Another form of cloud deployment being developed is the concept of the Tactical 
Cloud. Essentially, this means extending cloud services out to the tactical edge (e.g., afloat 
and expeditionary forward operating units) where communications systems operate using 
relatively low data-rate, high-latency, unstable networks, typically over a satellite 
communications (SATCOM) link which inherently limits the richness of media that can be 
exchanged. Tactical clouds aim to provide the benefits of cloud services in an austere 
environment. 
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b. Cloud Service Models 
The second broad category further refines cloud scope into three service levels 
known as software as a service (SaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), and infrastructure as 
a service (IaaS) (Mell & Grance, 2011) as illustrated in Figure 9. 
 
Source: https://cic.gsa.gov/basics/cloud-security. 
Figure 9. Cloud Service Levels.  
In this figure, information systems management is broken up into nine separate 
categories. Starting from the left, legacy information systems are managed exclusively by 
the customer with management responsibilities gradually shifting to the cloud provider 
while progressing to the right through the service levels. 
c. Cloud Implementations 
Transition to a cloud-based infrastructure enables the efficient use resources via on-
demand provisioning of shared storage, processing, memory, and network resources. Cloud 
computing also benefits from the ability to observe and implement industry standards and 
best practices to deliver a full range of services to a broad audience by leveraging 
commercial technology and distributed computing techniques over high capacity, low 
latency, stable, and robust networks. Cloud systems are a natural fit for AI/ML 
applications, big data warehousing, interoperability, and a common user experience. 
43 
Current cloud initiatives within the DOD include the Joint Enterprise Defense 
Infrastructure (JEDI) and the SOF Information Environment (SIE). JEDI is envisioned as the 
DOD’s general, all-purpose enterprise cloud, which leverages commercial technology to 
deploy a single-source cloud infrastructure in support of operations from garrison to the 
tactical edge. JEDI will serve as the foundation for fast, flexible, and adaptive cloud services 
to users across all enclaves to enable efficient data sharing, cross domain solutions, advanced 
data analytics, and improved cybersecurity (Department of Defense, 2021). 
USSOCOM continues to invest in the development of the SIE to provide services 
similar to JEDI which are tailored to the unique operational requirements of the SOF 
community. The SIE is managed by the Global Enterprise Operations Center (GEOC), co-
located at USSOCOM Headquarters, and connects over 70,000 SOFNET users and 1,200 
deployed nodes around the world (Thomas, 2017). Part of this development is the concept of 
the SOF Hybrid Cloud which according to the USSOCOM Chief Information Officer, Lisa 
Costa, “leverages hyperconverged infrastructure already on the network to host private cloud 
and take advantage of commercial cloud providers to host our [provider agnostic] 
containerized applications” (Stone, 2019, paragraph 5). 
4. Advanced Data Strategies and Concepts 
The final section of emerging technology focuses on advanced data strategies and 
concepts used to facilitate the collection, aggregation, storage and analysis throughout all 
levels of the data, information, knowledge continuum to enable “improved tactical action, 
faster and more accurate decision making, and adaptive, dynamic planning” (Godin, 2021, 
pg. 6). Current trends in operational data strategy center around building a robust, 
interoperable data layer, capable of ingesting and storing all data in a common format, 
processing and categorizing that data into information, then contextualizing and transforming 
that information into usable knowledge. As this data layer touches data, information, and 
knowledge, a more generalized description would be the data, information, and knowledge 
layer. 
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a. Relational Databases 
Traditionally, data has been collected and stored in relational databases which 
organize data into a series of interrelated tables with pre-defined relationships. Relational 
databases work well for finite, two-dimensional, well-structured datasets, however struggle to 
process rich media (such as the ubiquitous sensor and imagery feeds NSW employs) and are 
extremely difficult to operate at scale in a cloud environment. 
b. Big Data 
Next-generation systems are designed to incorporate big data technology to overcome 
the limitations of traditional data-processing architectures. Big data refers to a process of 
storage, analysis, and systematic data extraction of information from extremely large datasets 
which is often described in terms of the “Five V’s” which are volume, velocity, variety, 
veracity, and value. Essentially, the Five V’s describe the amount a data a system can handle, 
how quickly it can process it, what formats it can accommodate, how accurate or true data is, 
and how useful it is. 
Volume and velocity are largely the functions of infrastructure. As previously 
discussed, big data is closely associated with cloud computing, and is therefore constrained 
by available processing, networking, and storage resources. Variety on the other hand depends 
much more on the composition and organization of the data and falls into three main 
categories: structured, semi-structured, and unstructured. 
• Structured. Strictly defined length and format, e.g., a phone-number, latitude 
/ longitude, dates, etc. 
• Semi-Structured. Follows a general format but does not conform to a strict 
format. Log files are an example of semi-structured data often include time-
stamps, event numbers, free-form narratives, chat, and other data. 
• Unstructured. Does not conform to a standard format or fit easily into a 
traditional relational database column / raw format. Video, audio, imagery, 
books, articles, and email communications are examples of unstructured 
data. 
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Veracity refers how complete, accurate, and trustworthy data is for a given 
application. Some applications may require an extremely precise dataset while others may 
need a less detailed input to achieve a desired result. For example, a C2 system such as GCCS 
may provide adequate resolution as long as tracks are updated every couple of minutes, 
whereas a ballistic missile defense system requires a real-time, target-quality input. Finally, 
value is determined by the relative usefulness of the available data. 
c. Multi-dimensional Databases 
 Leading the way in next-generation data handling is multi-dimensional storage. 
Where relational databases are two-dimensional in nature, organized in a strict hierarchy of 
constraining pre-defined relationships, multi-dimensional storage integrates the various tables 
into a single entity comprised of multiple dimensions. This approach provides a data 
management foundation for information/knowledge exploitation needs, using advanced 
analytical processes called on-line analytical processing. An additional benefit of this storage 
method is that these multi-dimensional arrays are able to store and operate over sparse data 
such as audio, video, and imagery.  
d. Data Strategy in Support of Naval Operational Architecture 
In a recent study entitled Data Strategy in Support of the Naval Operational 
Architecture, Godin describes a revolutionary data strategy for the Navy based on the 
implementation of a common, scalable, core data management framework, using the multi-
dimensional databases. This approach provides the foundation upon which the rest of the data 
strategy relies.  Loading these data into this next-generation storage creates a basis for building 
a DIK pyramid as the foundation for the DIK layer (Godin, 2021).  
A data lake is a cloud-based repository that holds large amounts of raw data in its 
native form that can then be leveraged by any number of secondary applications to achieve a 
desired function. Instead of data being stored in a hierarchical system that is organized by files 
and folders, data lakes use a flat architecture where all data is visible and assigned a unique 
identifier and labeled through the use of metadata, which is a set of data that describes and 
gives information about other data. Examples of metadata are data size, date of collection, 
quality, source, keywords, etc., which are standardized by the use of formally defined 
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vocabularies and component relationships known as ontologies. The key benefit to the use of 
the data lake format is that it creates an authoritative source of data that is unaltered and 
considered to be true since no logic, processing, or conversions have been applied. Well-
structured multi-dimensional array storage is a natural complement to the data lake as it 
provides the native ability to slice, dice, and subset incoming data. 
Collecting, tagging, and categorizing all available data into properly catalogued data 
lakes, with embedded well-structured multi-dimensional arrays lays the foundation for 
advanced AI/ML enabled command and control systems. The use of first, second, and third 
wave AI principles in support of advanced data analysis will enable an end-state which Godin 
describes as operators and decision makers being “informed by actionable knowledge, 
organized around situations, which gives them insights and predictive future states to assist 
them to make the best possible tactical moves” (Godin, 2021, pg. 67). 
H. SUMMARY 
 This chapter explored the definitions and concepts related to digital mission 
command. Mission command is a form of command and control. Leaders hypothesize that its 
use will be crucial to success with near peer competitors. Mission command depends on 
subordinate leaders understanding the commander’s intent through iterative processes with 
their superiors, and a knowledge environment supported by emerging data technologies, 
which enable these smaller units to have increased amounts of valuable information at the 
right time on a right device. 
 Processes exist to organize that data. Such ideas as CCIRs, PIRs, and RFIs help 
organize collection and dissemination processes. Each phase of operations from planning to 
execution to post mission, have their own set of data challenges. These constructs, though, 
remain useful as organizing principles. 
 Emerging technologies, such as unmanned systems and new sensors, suggest there 
will be even more data available to support mission command. Other technologies, such as 
clouds, AI/ML, and multi-dimensional array storage, offer the promise that Navy Special 
Warfare will be able to leverage these data in remarkable new ways, ways that make mission 
command, now digitized, very effective and efficient. 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter I, this research explored the topic of interest, digital mission command, 
which laid out a vision of an integrated, assured, and resilient global command and control 
capability that leverages cutting-edge technology to achieve operational advantage in 
support of NSW operations in the maritime, littoral, and riverine environments. The 
research objective was to describe how NSW should proceed from their present state to a 
digital mission command posture. This is because NSW currently enjoys information 
dominance the majority of the time which allows for extensive collaboration and support 
from higher headquarters. With the resumption of great-power competition and rise of 
increasingly capable state and non-state actors, such assumptions of dominance can no 
longer be made. Therefore, a return to the tenants of mission command and mission-type 
orders, enhanced by modern communications and technology, must be relied upon to 
address this challenge. Chapter II explored a number of topics relevant to this research 
including the NSW operations, organizational structure, as well as the nature of command 
and control and mission command and the technologies that enable them. This chapter 
provides an explanation of the approach needed to move from the current NSW 
environment to an imagined new world where mission command, supported by the newest 
capabilities derived from digital readiness, are embraced. 
B. APPROACH 
Numerous approaches exist to determine how to incorporate emerging technologies 
into existing organizational processes in order to achieve a more efficient, capable end-
state. When selecting an approach, one must consider how the transition is both informed 
and influenced by the organization’s people, processes, and technologies. The Business 
Process Re-engineering (BPR) cycle addresses all three of these components and is 




Figure 10. The Business Process Reengineering Cycle 
Using this as a starting point, this research effort employed a methodology which 
consists of identifying processes, analyzing the current environment, imagining the future 
environment and identifying areas for improvement. 
1. Identify Processes 
Processes are a set of procedures or steps taken to attain a certain end. Following 
are the sets of characteristics, functions, or opportunities that drive process. 
a. Mission Command 
Since this research addresses mission command, Table 3 lists the seven 
characteristics that apply to NSW operations which should be considered when mapping 
the current to the future state. 
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b. C2 / Communications Systems Characteristics 
Second, since mission command is a form of command and control that is leveraged 
by the use of technology, ensure the current and future states are compared through the 
lens of C2 and communications systems characteristics. Regardless of age or 
sophistication, C2 systems serve eight core functions as described in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Eight Core Functions of C2 Systems. Source: JCS (2019). 
 
 
c. Processes supported by Mission Command 
There are three main processes associated with mission command: planning, 
execution, and post mission reporting and analysis. 
d. Review of findings 
Subject matter experts, faculty, and literature were used to validate assumptions 
and verify that the details of the previous factors are correct and appropriate to support 
research objectives. 
2. Capture the Current Architecture 
The current architecture represents a snapshot in time of a system that is constantly 
evolving and is different for every situation. This research will establish an understanding 
of current technologies and procedures using existing tactical publications and technical 
drawings. Further, it will leverage subject matter experts, faculty and relevant personnel to 
verify findings and gain additional insight. This architecture is based on information and 
data available at the unclassified for the purpose of exploring the feasibility of 
implementing a new data strategy in support of digital mission command NSW operations. 
It is not intended to represent the entirety of the SOF communications systems, capabilities, 
or processes. 
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3. Imagine the Future Architecture 
Once the current architecture is understood, the next step is to imagine a new, more 
effective set of systems and procedures that are informed by emerging technologies and 
personal experience and expertise. Recognizing that the future environment is anticipated 
to experience increased disruptions and denials of communications and networking, the 
future state should account for those obstacles. Table 5 lists the key emerging technologies 
discussed in Chapter II that research indicates will significantly impact the drive towards a 
robust digital Mission command capability.  
Table 5. Emerging Technologies 
 
 
Imagining techniques were augmented by talking to faculty as well as multiple data 
and operational subject matter experts. Additionally, knowledge gained through numerous 
Network Operations and Technology curriculum courses served as inspiration for how to 
effectively integrate emerging technologies. 
4. Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided an explanation of the approach used in Chapter IV to evaluate 
the current as-is environment, to a proposed to-be environment that employs emerging 
technologies in support of the NSW Digital Mission Command initiative. 
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IV. RESEARCH ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter I discusses Naval Special Warfare’s role within the Special Operations 
community and its primacy within the maritime, littoral, and riverine environments. 
Widely regarded as the gold-standard for special operations, the Navy SEAL embodies the 
spirit of the “silent professional,” supported by a world class organization made up of 
highly trained, motivated, and well-resourced personnel, to project power on, under, and 
from the sea (DON, 2018). One of the reasons for NSW’s continued success over the years 
is its uncanny ability to adapt, overcome, and thrive in an uncertain and rapidly changing 
environment. A tremendous accomplishment by itself, one must acknowledge that past 
performance in no way guarantees future success. Recent socio-economic, geopolitical, 
and technological trends have painted a dismal picture of the future operational 
environment where the United States will no longer enjoy the advantages as the world’s 
sole remaining superpower. To this end, NSW must continue to evolve to meet the 
mounting challenges of future operations. 
In Chapter II, emphasis was placed on differentiating between command and 
control, mission command, and command and control systems. While it is important to 
know what they are, it is equally as important to understand what they are not. Therefore, 
a thorough understanding of these three concepts is required to adequately describe their 
operational and technical relationships. Chapter II also discussed five areas of emerging 
technology which are projected to have a major impact on special operations. These 
technologies are broadly categorized as unmanned autonomous systems, artificial 
intelligence, cloud computing, advanced data architectures/strategies, and advanced 
communications architectures. 
Chapter III provided an analytical framework for this chapter consisting of process 
identification, determination of NSW’s current architecture, imagination of a future 
architecture which employs emerging technology and a comparison between the two. The 
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results of this comparison will be used to inform current and future NSW efforts to create 
a robust digital mission command capability. 
B. DIGITAL MISSION COMMAND ANALYSIS 
1. Command and Control 
As discussed in Chapter II, command and control is the “exercise of authority and 
direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the 
accomplishment of mission” (JCS, 2017, pg. 15) and is a combination of two major 
functions. 
Command and control is a fluid concept which varies by commander, organization, 
mission requirements, geographic location, and the operational environment. For example, 
SOF operations in the Pacific AOR requires an emphasis on the core activity of special 
reconnaissance in a maritime or littoral environment where NSW forces have primacy, 
whereas operations in the Middle East may focus more on land-based counter-insurgency 
and counter-terrorism activities in a supporting role as a member of a joint special 
operations task force (JSOTF). 
The current generation of C2 systems primarily focus on the core control functions 
of feedback, information, and communications. This provides situational awareness to the 
commander in support of the command function of decision making. Decision making 
remains a largely manual process whereby an individual or staff will examine available 
information, apply context, and then make recommendations to the commander for 
consideration. The flow of data, converted to actionable information, is the lifeblood of 
decision making. 
2. Mission Command 
As mentioned before, mission command is a specific method for the employment 
of command and control, with deep roots within the maritime domain. Mission command 
employs centralized command and decentralized control and execution, exploiting the 
“human element” and requiring a thorough understanding of the commander’s intent 
coupled with disciplined subordinate initiative (JCS, 2020). 
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Despite advances in communications and C2 systems across the joint force, the 
proliferation of communications-denial capabilities threatens the ability to maintain robust, 
reliable C2 networks. Such a loss results in the commander’s inability to maintain the same 
level of control enjoyed in a more permissive environment, necessitating the need for a 
mission command approach. 
With a few exceptions, current C2 systems only address the shared understanding 
aspect of mission command. Futures systems must incorporate additional functionality to 
enhance the remaining elements of competence, mutual trust, mission orders, commander’s 
intent, disciplined initiative, and risk acceptance. 
C. CURRENT ARCHITECTURE 
To better visualize the current architecture, it is useful to provide a brief description 
of the C4I environment. The current environment is largely shaped by the past twenty years 
of operations which are characterized by the global war on terrorism, regional stability, and 
low intensity conflicts against a procession of technologically inferior, but highly mobile 
and adaptive opponents. To address these challenges, the joint force developed an 
extremely capable C4ISR system which provides unprecedented levels of connectivity, 
efficiency, and lethality. The current system is heavily dependent on the free flow of 
information where the satellite communications, overhead imagery, and all-domain 
superiority within the context of a permissive electromagnetic and cyber environment is, 
for the most part, assumed. 
All of this has provided commanders with the ability to exercise C2 with a speed 
and fidelity that was previously unimaginable. As a result, many processes and decision-
making authorities that were once delegated to lower echelons have been concentrated at 
higher levels where it is argued that well-manned, well-connected staffs are often in a better 
position to see the “bigger picture,” make better decisions, and provide increased support 
to ongoing tactical missions. 
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1. Organizational Relationships 
Due to the wide range of missions SOF is called upon to perform, there is no one 
“standard” operational chain of command. NSW forces normally deploy with three 
NSWTUs commanded by an O-4, and one NSWTG HQ, commanded by an O-5 (DON, 
2018). NSWTEs represent the baseline platoon which is typically an eight-person, O-2 
command. While NSW operations normally occur in conjunction with other forces, for the 
purposes of this research, the operational chain of command refers to the C2 relationships 
as they relate a notional NSWTG deployed in support of a geographic combatant 
commander (GCC). The NSWTG, NSWTU, and NSWTE construct was chosen to 
highlight differences in the size, capability, and function of deployed NSW forces. An 
example of an operational chain of command is shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. Notional Operational Chain of Command 
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(1) Strategic / Operational Level 
A theater special operations command (TSOC) is a functional sub-unified 
command organized under USSOCOM. OPCON of deployed SOF units is delegated to the 
TSOC while USSOCOM retains COCOM. The Secretary of Defense then delegates 
OPCON of the TSOC to the respective GCC. In this scenario, the primary function of the 
TSOC is to plan and execute SOF operations on behalf of the GCC and delegates tactical 
control (TACON) to a JSOTF for execution. 
(2) Tactical Level 
A JSOTF is an O-6 command composed of SOF units from multiple services that 
executes SOF activities as directed by the TSOC in support of a specific mission or 
operational area. The JSOTF may designate additional SOTFs to conduct component-
specific operations. 
The NSWTG is the NSW equivalent of a SOTF which serves as the headquarters 
for NSW operations and is comprised of two or more NSTUs. Of note, the NSWTG N6 is 
responsible for the management and support of all subordinate NSW communications 
requirements including network operations, communications, computer network defense, 
and frequency management. 
NSWTUs exercise C2 over three or more NSWTEs and are typically forward-
deployed to different locations within the operating area to increase tactical reach. 
NSWTEs represent the tactical edge and may be broken into smaller maneuver elements 
which may or may not have reliable communications with the main body, even in the best 
of circumstances. 
2. Communications Architecture 
NSW is part of an integrated SOF communications architecture, primarily managed 




Figure 12. NSW Communications Architecture Overview. 
a. SOF Information Environment 
The SOF Information Environment (SIE) is the primary network used by the special 
operations community to process, store, disseminate and present data in support of vital C2 
processes. The SIE is a cloud-enabled network that offers a full complement of secret, top-
secret, and unclassified services, including SOFNET, to provide a common operating 
environment for SOF elements. SIE is connected to other DOD, component specific, and 
external networks via the Defense Information Systems Agency Information Network 
(DISN). Commands directly connected to the SIE include USSOCOM, 
NAVSPECWARCOM and the various TSOCs. 
b. Satellite Deployable Nodes 
Deployed NSW forces are able to access the SIE via a SOF Tactical Gateway. Units 
establish a satellite link over military or commercial SATCOM with a SOF Tactical 
Gateway via a Satellite Deployable Node (SDN). SDNs come in three different 
configurations, light, medium, and heavy, which provide varying levels of service based 
on the needs of the supported unit. As shown in Figure 12, typical aggregate data-rates 
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range from approximately 40Mbps at the headquarters level down to 5 Mbps at the forward 
element and can be adjusted based on mission requirements. Decreases in data-rates will 
result in a corresponding decrease in available services. 
SDNs also have the ability to use available tactical infrastructure or commercial 
internet services providers also known as “dirty” internet to establish virtual private 
network connection with the Tactical Gateway to establish SIE connectivity. Similar 
network functionality can be achieved through the use of other mobile communications 
platforms such as the Tactical Local Area Network (TACLAN) which can use various IP 
sources to provide scalable network solutions. 
c. Communications 
Tactical communications links over SATCOM, line of sight (LOS) and beyond line 
of sight (BLOS) circuits provide additional voice and data capability among the various 
levels of command, again predicated on C2 and mission requirements. Commonly used 
radios include the PRC-117G, PRC-160, PRC-163, and the PRC-167. 
NSW employs a number of non-traditional tactical capabilities including Radio 
over IP (RoIP) and Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANET) as shown in Figures 13 and 14 as 
well as field wearable equipment such as the Android Tactical Assault Kit (ATAK). 
 
Figure 13. Example of Radio over IP. 
RoIP essentially uses a specialized system to receive incoming radio frequency 
communications, convert and pass over an IP network, and then rebroadcast at another 
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location to overcome line of sight limitations. An RoIP network can additionally be used 
to establish communications between an RF user and any user with IP connectivity. 
 
Figure 14. Example of a MANET. 
MANET capable radios such as the Trellis TSM-950 are able to automatically 
establish communications of up to 16Mbps with other radios within LOS to create a mesh 
network where one radio can communicate via voice and data to any other radio within the 
mesh. Figure 14 presents a simple MANET where the nodes are separated into three groups 
based on their line of sight. In this instance, a node from Group 1 can communicate with a 
node in Group 3 without a direct line of sight using the center node in Group 2 as a relay. 
The PRC-163 and PRC-167 are also MANET capable. 
The Android Tactical Assault Kit is a portable, android based system which can 
provide a variety of features including live video feeds, personnel tracking, image sharing, 
navigation, coordination, and chat using available data paths. 
3. Processes 
The three major processes involved with an operation are planning, execution and 
post-mission analysis and feedback. This section examines these three processes from the 
NSWTG and below perspective in the current environment, with an emphasis on which 




Planning is a process which falls into the decision-making element of control is 
typically initiated by a triggering event. Trigger events take many forms including the 
receipt of an order from the JSOTF or in response to a CCIR for an existing mission. Once 
triggered, the NSWTG staff will assemble an operational planning team (OPT) and 
commence the planning process. OPT membership varies dependent upon the specific 
mission, but includes representation from the administration, intelligence, current 
operations, logistics, communications, and plans departments who contribute their 
specialized knowledge to the overall process. Of note, the efficiency and effectiveness of 
an OPT depends on the collective experience of the group and the quality of their 
information which must be manually fused to provide an output. 
(1) Mission Analysis 
The first task is mission analysis where OPT members determine the objectives of 
the mission and manually break it down into a series of essential, specified and implied 
tasks as well as the mission’s constraints (must do), and restraints (can’t do). A thorough 
understanding is required by the members of the OPT of all relevant guidance and 
directives pertaining to the mission being analyzed. This can be a significant undertaking, 
dependent on the AOR as standing guidance can come from GCC, TSOC, JTF 
Commander, component, and any number of governmental and non-governmental 
organizations. 
Once the OPT has established a common understanding of the mission and its 
objectives, they must examine the operational environment. As discussed in Chapter II, 
PMESII-PT is useful for strategic-level planning, while mission variables are more 
applicable to operational and tactical planning. Mission variables include the mission, as 
previously described, as well as the locations and dispositions of enemy forces, the location 
of friendly forces, the availability of friendly forces and logistics, terrain and weather, and 
the time available. This represents a tremendous amount of data and information without 
any shared foundation that must be manually analyzed and fused at the human level within 
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the context of the defined mission with sources ranging from C2 systems, daily “products,” 
all the way down to individual operational reports. 
Operations and intelligence are two areas that are especially difficult to achieve 
operational understanding given current systems and processes. Operations intelligence 
can be seen as two sides of the same coin with operations concentrating on the location, 
movement, and capability of friendly forces on the location and employment of friendly 
forces while intelligence does the same for enemy forces and provides additional insight 
with the development of an assessment of the enemy’s most likely course of action 
(MLCOA), and most dangerous course of action (MDCOA). Both require a thorough 
understanding of the current operational environment and leverage the historic data and 
past experience to predict a future state. 
Current data structures inhibit the ability to obtain, or even be aware of, relevant 
data due to stovepiped systems or processes, no data dictionary, and manual information 
management practices. In order to use information, one must first know that information 
exists, and then be able to access and use it. 
(2) COA Development 
The OPT uses the mission analysis to create courses of action (COA) which is a 
sequence of activities or scheme developed to accomplish the missions. Three COAs are 
produced which provide the commander options. The COAs are differentiated based on 
commander’s guidance. For example, the first COA provides an option that is air-heavy, a 
second COA that is land-heavy, and a third COA that combines the two. 
COA development is a human intensive process where the OPT members manually 
fuse information from the previous step to produce a list of objectives, required forces, task 
organization, scheme of maneuver, timelines, sustainment, communications, and 
associated risks to produce a coherent representation of the recommended course of action, 
typically generated by hand in PowerPoint format. 
Whereas mission analysis focused on knowledge discovery, COA development 
centers on understanding that knowledge and applying such understanding to the problem. 
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For example, force identification requires knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of 
that force within the context of the proposed task, a scheme of maneuver consider the 
mobility, sustainability, and supportability of that unit in the field, while all the while 
maintaining synchronicity with the rest of the force. Current systems and processes are in 
some ways extremely capable of providing specific information, but fall well short of 
providing the level of fidelity, continuity, and cause-and-effect knowledge required for 
effective planning. 
(3) COA Analysis and Wargaming 
COA analysis examines the proposed COAs in an attempt to gain additional insight 
into the problem and refine a specific COA prior to COA comparison. COA analysis is 
primarily accomplished through wargaming, which may consist of the current OPT 
members talking through a series of “what ifs,” to a more detailed analysis conducted by a 
dedicated wargaming staff. 
The input to this process is a well-developed COA which meets the basic 
requirements of the mission in accordance with the commander’s guidance. As this thesis 
is concerned with NSW operations in a deployed environment, the assumption is that COA 
analysis will be conducted by the members of the OPT based on their operational 
experience. Members will step through the different parts of the COA in an effort to 
determine how to maximize the use of friendly forces, anticipate enemy reactions, focus 
intelligence and collection requirements, and identify gaps and seams with the plan, and 
create a synchronization matrix. Again, this is a human intensive process which relies on 
individual experience to analyze the COA which could result in an inexperienced team 
presenting an unsuitable COA. Additional outputs are potential decision points and their 
associated CCIRs and FFIRs and a list of the COA’s advantages and disadvantages. 
(4) COA Comparison 
COA comparison is a relatively straight forward process whereby the different 
COAs developed and analyzed by the OPT are compared against each other in accordance 
with established evaluation criteria. This enables staff principles to recommend a preferred 
COA to the commander. 
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Evaluation criteria is determined by considering the commander’s guidance and 
factors that affect the success of the mission. For example, three COAs may be presented 
which provide a speed-based option, a mass-based option, or a combination of the two. If 
the commander’s guidance placed emphasis on agility and economy of force, but the speed-
based option incurred an inordinate amount of risk, the balanced option may be the better 
choice. Without some form of digitization, this process becomes extremely subjective and 
is prone to confirmation bias or manipulation in order to arrive at a specific pre-determined 
outcome. 
(5) COA Approval 
After the staff is satisfied with the COAs presented by the OPTs, the COAs will be 
presented to the commander along with a staff recommendation. As the commander has 
provided guidance throughout the process, at this point he/she has the option to accept the 
staff’s recommendation as-is, accept the staff’s recommendation with modifications, 
choose one of the other COAs with or without modification, combine two or more COAs. 
In rare instances, the commander may elect to reject all of the COAs presented, which 
requires the OPT to start the entire process over. Since this is a manual process, many of 
the previous steps will have to be repeated. Once an acceptable COA has been approved 
by the commander, the staff will then move on to the final step of the planning process 
which is plan / order development. 
(6) Plan / Order Development 
Order development directly relates to the control function of direction which 
communicated information related to a decision to initiate and govern the actions of 
subordinate units. Orders are typically issued in record message traffic in the situation, 
mission, execution, admin and logistics, command and signal (SMEAC) format which was 
described in detail in Chapter II. A voice command (VOCO) can be used to initiate an 
immediate response, but is normally followed by an official message. 
With very few exceptions, orders are “hand-jammed” into a text document. This 
process requires an inordinate amount of time and effort from the entire staff to generate, 
review, approve for release. The operations department normally initiates the message and 
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translates the approved COA into text format which typically involves using the most 
recent order as a template. Once the operations department has created the draft, the 
message is staffed to the various departmental or functional action officers for their review 
and input. The message is then routed through the department heads and returned to the 
operations officer or chief of staff for final review before being submitted to the 
commander for approval. 
Data and information play crucial roles in the planning process which includes 
several elements such as CCIRs, FFIR, and PIRs. During the execution stage, being aware 
of these key requirements will keep watch standers engaged. 
b. Execution 
Once the commander has determined a course of action, it must be executed. 
Execution is the manifestation of all the elements of control to manage and direct forces 
and functions in accordance with the plan and commander’s intent. A useful way to analyze 
execution processes is through the use of the previously mentioned OODA framework 
which we use to examine execution from the NSWTG HQ and NSWTU/NSWTE forward 
element perspective. 
(1) Observe 
Observation is the required step for situational awareness as it is a process of 
sensemaking. Observational data comes in many forms including live sensor data, unit 
reporting, and intelligence products such as real-time alerts. Due to the nature of the 
sources of observations, observational data is, generally, organized spatio-temporally. 
First, sensor data is obtained from array of sources ranging from organic 
capabilities all the way up to national technical means. The current data infrastructure 
inhibits access to certain sources as a result of classification levels, system stovepipes, and 
proprietary data formats. The NSWTG HQ is able to access many of these external 
resources through systems such as DCGS, however bandwidth limitations ordinarily 
prevent full exploitation of the capability. The problem is amplified at the tactical edge 
where external sensor data is generally not available. Conversely, deployed forces have 
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limited ability to share organic sensor data with the larger intelligence community for the 
same reasons. 
Unit reports commonly occur via voice, chat, or as part of a daily sitrep. The result 
is a bottom-up data flow from the NSWTE, to the NSWTU, to the NSWTG, where reports 
are evaluated and consolidated prior to reporting to the JSOTF. This creates a disparity in 
situational awareness among the different elements causing potentially useful data to be 
inaccessible at the tactical edge where it is, arguably, most needed. 
Intelligence products can provide unprocessed operational data such as enemy 
movements, weather reports, open-source reporting digests which may be of interest to the 
individual NSW units. Again, bandwidth constraints inhibit the ability of the unit to receive 
and take advantage of these products. Further, while the HQ maintains a dedicated 
intelligence directorate, reduced manning at the lower levels limits the ability to process 
observational data into actionable forms by the NSWTUs and NSWTEs. Typically, tactical 
units must rely on HHQ as the conduit for processed external information and knowledge, 
which are then fused with organic data sources to improve resolution. 
(2) Orient 
Observational data feeds the processes that establish spatio-temporal situational 
awareness within a given operational area. The majority of C2 systems including GCCS-
J, AIDE, and CIDNE fall into this category which collect, process, and display 
observational data into a visualized representation of the operating environment. As with 
DCGS, these systems require a certain level of IP connectivity and manning to employ 
which ordinarily limits their use to NSWTG HQ level and above. 
The NSWTG normally maintains a 24-hour battle watch which serves as the 
primary operational point of contact. Watch compositions can vary, but generally consist 
of a battle watch captain (BWC) who oversees subordinate watch stations as required. 
BWC responsibilities include being the primary point of contact for operations, maintain 
situational awareness, enforce reporting requirements, and notify the commander and staff 
of significant changes or deviations in the operational environment in accordance with 
established procedures and CCIRs. Often, BWCs are tasked with additional reporting 
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requirements by individual directorates which can result in cognitive overload and the loss 
of situational awareness during times of increased operational tempo. 
The NSWTG HQ battle-rhythm drives the creation of products which center on 
fusing relevant data at a directorate and command level that affect operations. These 
products primarily serve to keep the commander informed and can then be distributed to 
subordinated units in an attempt to maintain shared situational awareness. This process is 
extremely manpower intensive as information must be obtained from different sources and 
then pieced together into a usable format. For example, a comprehensive red force product 
may consolidate data from GCCS-J, AIDE, message traffic, unit sitreps, voice reports, and 
live sensor data to populate and annotate a map on a PowerPoint slide. This is just one of 
many types of products which can take multiple people many hours to create and is often 
out-of-date before it is even released. The more time spent on creating products results in 
less time for detailed analysis in support of mission objectives. External units such as the 
JSOTF, TSOC, and NSW MSC, provide similar products and services as well, however 
tailored information gets progressively more difficult to produce as distance from the 
problem increases. Further, any support provided by higher echelons must be transmitted 
over communications paths that may not be available. 
Provided they can be received, these products can be extremely useful at the tactical 
edge, but only able to depict a situation as it was at the time of their creation. Forward 
elements must rely on their own observations and sensory capabilities to maintain 
situational awareness. This can be further augmented through the use of field-wearable 
devices such as ATAK to enable tactical communications and information sharing at the 
individual level using available mobile RF communications paths. 
(3) Decide 
The decision-making process remains a predominately human activity as no 
systems currently exist that can consolidate all relevant data, place into an appropriate 
context, and then make decision recommendations. Decisions are made by taking the 
outputs of the observe and orient, processes and then exercising personal experience and 
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judgment to determine if any changes are required to achieve mission objectives in 
accordance with commander’s intent. 
At the NSWTG HQ level, the BWC plays a key role in the decision-making process 
by applying existing policy and standing orders to situations as they arise. From a data 
perspective, decisions can easily be viewed in terms of the CCIRs and FFIRs which 
normally correlate with decision points. CCIRs and FFIRs are maintained at the BWC 
watchstation which must be manually applied to incoming reports to determine 
applicability. Certain CCIRs and FFIRs may trigger a simple procedural response such as 
a voice notification, or something more substantial such as the activation of a branch or 
sequel plan. Due to the tremendous amount of information processed by the BWC, there is 
an ever-present risk that a triggering event could be or overlooked, resulting in a failure to 
properly react to a situation.  
Finally, decisions are often made on the fly without the benefit of a watch team for 
backup. In this instance, quality decision-making relies on a person’s inherent 
understanding, competence, and experience within a given context. Deficits in any of these 
elements can result in the increased likelihood of a wrong decision being made or a decision 
being delayed until a better understanding can be achieved. For example, a simple decision 
by an inexperienced platoon leader such as the decision to go left or right may be the 
difference between taking a safe route to an objective or taking one that is regularly 
patrolled by enemy forces, inadvertently placing a unit at increased risk. 
(4) Act 
Once a decision has been made, it must be put into action. From an operational data 
perspective, this encompasses the control function of direction. Direction is enabled by the 
various communications and C2 systems to relay the results of a decision to initiate and 
govern the actions of subordinate units, thus completing the loop. 
c. Post-Mission Reporting and Analysis 
Mission debriefs are commonly conducted within the NSW community, however 
recording methods, submission requirements, and ensuing analysis vary. 
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(1) After Action Reports 
Once a mission is complete, it is best to capture everything that was learned from 
that mission as soon as possible, for several reasons. First, after-action reviews permit 
participating units to conduct a thorough self-examination of all the facts, circumstances, 
decisions, and results to identify what was done well, what was done poorly, and what 
could be done better while experience is still fresh. Just as a student is often most receptive 
to learning immediately following a test, operating elements can learn a great amount in a 
post-mission debrief. Second, it is crucial to document and preserve lessons learned from 
previous experiences and then apply them toward follow-on missions to avoid making the 
same mistakes twice. 
Often, post-mission analysis can produce realizations about erroneous assumptions, 
courses of actions, or other mistakes so adjustments can be made to future missions. Post-
mission analyses can access other tools to help complete more in-depth analysis of the 
mission findings, perhaps with tools that enhance captured sensor information. Finally, 
post mission debriefs are used in event reconstruction by long-term analysts, who use these 
reports to achieve higher-level understanding in support of campaign and theater level 
planning. In many respects, the post mission analysis process ends up being a starting point 
for the planning process. 
From a data and information collection perspective post mission analysis is a 
mishmash process. Some collection processes are digitized, but many spoken pearls of 
information are never collected. Much information is collected manually, and while the 
mission context at the post mission debrief is well understood by all involved, analysts and 
operators who come later may not be able to sufficiently discern the context to make the 
information valuable. Because the information is manually captured, much of it is just 
written on paper, never digitized, and locked away in an unknown filing cabinet for 
generations. 
Ideally, AARs are created and stored in a centralized repository to inform future 
planning and execution efforts. For example, an NSW unit could have been a participant 
in a recent Cobra Gold exercise where key training objectives at a remote location were 
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not met due to a lack of translators. The following year, a new NSW unit assigned to the 
same training event, can request the previous lessons learned which will enable them to 
engage early to get the appropriate support. Unfortunately, requests for previous AARs 
must be manually initiated and can quickly overwhelm any potential beneficiaries without 
significant human analysis and curation. This is especially true for smaller staffs and 
tactical units which lack the manpower to dedicate to sifting through AARs in search of 
something useful. 
(2) Additional Reports 
Other sources of reporting may be available incidentally as a result of normal 
operations. For instance, operational reports, situational reports, communications status 
reports, and casualty reports are among the various types of reporting required over record 
message traffic. Additionally, chat logs, system logs, deck logs, sensor data, voice 
recordings, archived files, and other types of data typically remain on their respective 
systems unless manually discovered and analyzed. 
4. Summary 
In the current environment, NSW leverages a permissive environment that depends 
on higher headquarter planning and execution support. Backup is readily reliable, and 
situational awareness is relatively easy to develop, maintain and share. 
Data and information flows are often manual, but NSW and the rest of the SOF 
community have learned over the past 20 years to adapt and overcome. General 
McCrystal’s book Team of Teams (McChrystal, 2015) is the prototypical example of a 
well-informed commander using every available source to command and control a myriad 
of forces successfully. 
In the future, executing digital mission command in, especially in a non-permissive 
environment, promises to highlight the limitations of these manual methods. Table 6 
outlines some potential trouble areas. 
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Table 6. Information and Data Flow Obstacles. 
 
 
D. FUTURE ARCHITECTURE 
The future C4I operational environment promises to be much different from the 
present. With the return of great power competition, future conflicts will involve 
adversaries who possess capabilities equal to or possibly even greater than our own, 
especially in the realm of electronic warfare. Operations within a communication denied, 
degraded, intermittent, or limited (DDIL) environment will become the norm, meaning the 
availability of high-capacity SATCOM links and the systems that rely on them will no 
longer be assured. Adversarial C4ISR systems will continue to grow in capability and hold 
friendly forces and infrastructure at risk. As the likelihood of isolation increases, mission 
command will once again be required to effectively C2 assigned forces. Digitizing mission 
command will ensure it preeminence on the future battlefield.  
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1. Future Organizational Relationships 
As organizational relationships are designated by a proper authority in accordance 
with doctrine, the overall operational chain of command will remain the same, at least at 
first. Eventually, such relationships may change depending on how the digitation efforts 
evolve, but it is too early to tell. Changing both a data strategy and the command 
relationships simultaneously is a recipe for confusion. Figure 15 illustrates the anticipated 
operational chain of command, enhanced through mission command principles. 
 
Figure 15. Future Operational Chain of Command. 
However, due to the anticipated challenges of the future operating environment, the 
commander will no longer have a reasonable expectation of maintaining reliable 
communications with any unit that relies of SATCOM which for the purposes of this 
scenario will be below the JSOTF level. While NSW is arguably among the best at 
implementing the concepts of mission command, the methodology will move from optional 
to essential in order to maintain an acceptable level of C2 over assigned forces. 
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2. Future Communications Architecture 
The overall future communications architecture is expected to remain relatively 
similar with the provision of USSOCOM managed IP services, augmented by tactical voice 
and data networks at its core. As digitization continues, data and information flows will be 
shifted to networks resulting in an exponential demand for bandwidth over terrestrial and 
satellite paths. Well-connected shore-based installations will experience the greatest 
benefit due to their ability to access ever-increasing levels of shared processing, storage, 
and network services within a robust cloud environment. 
At the other end of the spectrum, tactical units, will experience a much different 
reality as previously described. Emerging technologies are being developed to provide 
assured communications in a DDIL environment. Software-defined radios and networks 
coupled with next-generation compression and service models will provide improved 
flexibility in support of electronic maneuver. Low probability of intercept / low probability 
of detect techniques (LPI/LPD) such as direct-sequence spread spectrum (DSSS), 
frequency hopping and communications below the noise floor will undoubtedly ameliorate 
some of these challenges, however one must assume that potential adversaries are working 
just as hard to negate these efforts. Therefore, it must be assumed that the more emissions 
a unit produces, the more likely it is to be detected, jammed, tracked, or targeted. 
Regardless, as this thesis focuses on data flows and strategy, we will assume a 
similar level of communications capability and simply point out where data techniques 
could benefit users within a DDIL environment. That said, discussion of specific 
communications architectures ought to be the focus of a separate research effort. 
3. Future Processes 
This section will present a vision of how planning, execution, and post-mission 
analysis and feedback processes can be advanced to improve efficiency and capability in 
support of digital mission command. 
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a. Planning 
The intent of the planning process will not change. Triggering events will continue 
to initiate the planning process and the OPT will remain at the core of the effort. However, 
in this vision, the planning process is significantly improved through the use of technology 
and data techniques to produce a better-quality product more quickly. 
(1) Mission Analysis 
One of the most difficult tasks is to establish a common understanding of the 
dynamic operational environment constructed by processes triggered by environmental and 
operational events for a task organized into causal sequences. Put simply, this consists of 
triggering events that place static entities into motion. Future ISR capabilities, especially 
in the realm of unmanned autonomous vehicles and small-form organic sensors, will 
provide an exponential increase in the availability of real and near-real time data. The 
future system should collect, tag, categorize, and assemble events and entities into 
contextual, well-structured information and knowledge populated into storage based on 
multi-dimensional arrays. Further, future systems should support the automated discovery 
based on the intelligent orchestration of access to data sources to ensure multi-source 
fusion, relevant to the operational area at the specified level of classification.  
Additionally, future system developers should consider refraining from relying on 
mission variables. Unlike independent mission variables, future artifacts will depend on a 
multi-dimensional system of coordinates and aggregate functions which processing multi-
coordinate spaces into meaningful operational information. Knowledge-graph techniques 
should be used to represent mission artifacts which apply known characteristics, 
capabilities, and limitations that add depth to the data by making information out of it. This 
should significantly reduce reliance on biased individual experience to achieve common 
understanding by the OPT. Locations and dispositions of enemy forces, friendly forces, 
logistics, as well as weather and terrain and other required inputs will be presented in a 
common, real world-based format that is simple, repeatable, searchable, fusible and 
visualizable. 
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Access to historic data will inform the OPT of pattern of life trends to model and 
predict possible future world model states within the operational area. For example, a 
heatmap based on recent reports can show relative enemy activity for consideration when 
entering the COA development phase. MDCOA and MLCOAs, informed by previous 
actions, will provide additional insight into possible enemy tactical movements and actions. 
As many planning efforts support similar missions, OPT members will be presented with 
consistent plans along with the best practice recommendations derived from the AAR 
process to assist as a starting point. 
Planning activities should be tracked at the system level. This will enable the 
system to adapt to the individual preferences and processes of a staff, anticipate future 
requirements, and make suggestions based on past inquiries. There is even the possibility 
to use the data assets to better train staff officers serving on the OPT, by creating 
opportunities for new staff to create their own mock plans and develop their knowledge-
set and more effectively provide insight and feedback. 
(2) COA Development 
A large part of future COA development will be accomplished through the use of 
specialized systems using second and third wave AI principles. In this step, COAs can be 
created by applying a series of profiles to the model of the operational environment 
developed in the previous step toward specified objectives. For instance, an ‘air-heavy” 
profile would be applied to identify and present units typically associated with air 
operations informed by their current tasking, availability, and conditions of readiness or 
suitability. 
Once complete, a technically sound COA is generated which includes potential 
threats, complications, or other considerations for review by the OPT. Similar to mission 
analysis, the system should leverage historical data to adapt to staff processes and 
preferences. This will significantly decrease the time required for COA development and 
allow the OPT to focus on the big-picture issues instead of technical details. This process 
directly contributes to the mission command elements of competence and, if explainable, 
to a mutual trust between OPT members and machines as it is repeatable, fast, and 
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leverages multi-source, non-biased, and predictable datasets. Mutual trust is further 
improved as subordinates and senior decision makers will know they are using the same 
future insights generated by a shared contextualized knowledge base. 
(3) COA Analysis and Wargaming 
Traditionally, specialized human knowledge and experience has been required for 
effective wargaming. While the human element will remain important, analysis and 
wargaming will benefit tremendously through a human / machine teaming relationship. 
Advanced data techniques will enable a COA to be examined within the context of a near 
real-time, dynamic battlespace environment. This will allow visualization techniques to be 
used to represent a number of factors including enemy capabilities, friendly capabilities, 
potential for interaction, and relative risk. 
Contextual adaptation techniques based on historical data will provide the ability 
to project future world-state. For example, at the tactical level, statistical analysis has 
revealed an enemy unit generally conducts daily patrols from 0900–1300 along a known 
route. This information could be used to shift COA timelines to the left or right in order to 
avoid interaction with the unit and to create a CCIR which activates a branch plan in the 
event that an interaction does occur. 
(4) COA Comparison 
Again, COA comparison is a relatively straight forward process where the OPT 
evaluates the different COAs against established evaluation criteria. The future system 
should standardize the definitions of the various criteria and provide additional insight and 
objectivity when comparing COAs. Traditionally, suitability was determined by OPT 
members manually assessing the positives and negatives attributes of a COA with regard 
to commander’s guidance. For example, when comparing a mass-based COA and an 
economy-based COA, details could include a projected success rate, risk to mission, risk 
to force, or even how a specific COA impacts the overall ability to conduct follow-on 
actions. A digitized, automated process will enable a higher level of analysis with reduced 
bias. Plan digitization also makes the use of advanced game theory techniques possible. 
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(5) COA Approval 
As previously mentioned, the commander may elect to change, combine, or reject 
all COAs. While approval is solely the prerogative of the commander, additional guidance 
or changes at this stage will no longer require starting the entire process over. As everything 
has been digitized and updated dynamically, the OPT only needs to incorporate the updated 
guidance into the existing model, analyze, compare, and re-submit. 
(6) Plan / Order Development 
Record message traffic will likely remain the primary method to initiate and govern 
the actions of subordinate units as they satisfy the various legal requirements for “official” 
communications and can be easily transmitted over any available communications 
medium. The digitization of the planning process will augment this capability in a number 
of ways. First, it must be acknowledged that orders generation is more art than science, 
however there are many standard inputs that can be derived from the approved COA. These 
inputs should be identified and then digitally combined through the use of a common 
application which uses standard phraseologies and approved formats to produce an eighty 
percent solution which is then staffed for final review and approval. Second, as the COA 
is already digitized, a standard report can be generated to produce a CONOPs that is 
optimized for distribution, similar to the traditional PowerPoint / pdf, to promote shared 
understanding and maintain unity of effort. Finally, an interactive version could be created 
and distributed to subordinate commands which provides a C2 system overlay in order to 
visualize key elements, objectives, and features that can be updated in real-time from 
available sensors and reports in support of execution.  
A new product that might arise from orders development is the digitization of all 
the CCIRs, PIRs, and other suggested reporting requirements. This makes the possible use 
of smart agents much more likely.  
b. Execution 
The output of the planning process should be an improved plan which is based on 
a more accurate representation of the operational environment. Once approved, major C2 
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nodes such as the NSWTG HQ will be able to quickly visualize the CONOPs and 
implement the plan. Again, the future execution processes are analyzed through the lens of 
the OODA framework from the NSW perspective. 
(1) Observe 
As before, observational data remains a key input for situational awareness. Data 
strategies that facilitate collection, aggregation, storage, and discovery are key to getting 
the right data to the right place within a tactically relevant timeline. High level DOD 
initiatives, such as Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2), seek to connect 
sensors to shooters across a tightly-coupled, integrated network. Observational data from 
sensors, unit reports, intelligence products and other sources will be digitized into a 
standard format that enables further processing by various units in accordance with their 
needs in support of Joint C2. 
Enriched data will be curated via sanitization, correlation, fusion, and cause-effect 
analysis at the appropriate level of command based on the size-weight-and-power (SWaP) 
constraints and network bandwidth. Statistical analysis should be used to examine data 
usage patterns in order to identify which sources and data are most useful for operations at 
what periodicities. Critical operational data should then be optimized and automatically 
delivered at the appropriate resolution in accordance with a unit’s mission, geographic 
location, and level of command. The challenge for operating units will be to improve their 
capacity in order to clearly and digitally define their critical data needs so they can benefit 
from these data processing improvements. 
This will serve to reduce strain over already congested networks to ensure that all 
operationally relevant observational data is available while data that is not relevant is 
discarded. For instance, a unit may not need overhead imagery for an entire country, but 
would benefit tremendously from imagery within fifty miles of their position. Further, data 
can be optimized based on required periodicity. For example, an air track might require 
near-real time sensory data, whereas a ship might only require updates every ten minutes 
which would significantly reduce the data load across the network. 
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By standardizing the data, specialized processing techniques can be applied at scale 
in order provide tailored, optimized products for consumption. This assertion holds true 
from the NSWTG level, all the way out to at the tactical edge where bandwidth is at a 
premium. An increased level of discrimination over optimized and prioritized operational 
data will enable a range of delivery options and communications techniques in support of 
operations within a contested electromagnetic environment. Further, it is important that 
future systems be able to symmetrically transform and exchange data between the edge and 
higher levels to ensure that information natively born “at the edge” can be both processed 
locally and forwarded to higher level units for aggregation and future fusion. 
As previously noted, timely, relevant, and complete observational data is the 
starting point of the execution process and serves as a primary enabler for the principles of 
mission command. Without it, there is no input into the orient process, no shared situational 
understanding, and no ability to apply commander’s intent, assess risk, or to conduct 
disciplined initiative. 
(2) Orient 
Traditionally, the end product of a C2 system was limited to a track displayed on a 
common operational picture which must be interpreted by a qualified human expert in order 
to achieve situational awareness and anticipate follow-on movements and actions. Focus 
on a single target by one or few shooters is intrinsically unscalable. The real future fight is 
many-on-many. Future systems, however, will leverage analytical data techniques to 
enrich the track data within the context of enveloping environments (including A2AD) to 
shift a large portion of the orientation burden to the machine. 
First, future C2 systems should provide the ability to represent a rich operational 
environment. Knowledge Base (KB) representations will create a world view that is 
interactive and based on an authoritative object and action where the latter assigns 
attributes to a static object to create a dynamic one per a task definition within the 
operational environment. Without getting into too much detail, fixed features such as an 
enemy garrison, a radar station, or a friendly logistical node might be represented, each 
with its own base characteristics that can interact with other objects. These features can be 
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further modified by the inclusion and association of operational data to accurately depict 
an object’s capabilities to threaten or enhance the force. 
Once a steady state system behavior is achieved, operational data from the previous 
step can then be linked by sequencing the previous triggering event with the current one. 
The previous step may now be injected into the KB’s representation by chaining previous 
and current steps together, thereby expressing a cause-and-effect relationship. The 
interaction of these two elements can then be used to calculate spheres of influence, relative 
capabilities of one over another, or other operationally relevant associations. Historical 
data will be used to make statistically informed assessments of future world-states such as 
probable flight or patrol paths of active units. 
Interactive CONOPs developed and distributed in the planning stage can be applied 
to the current operational picture in order to provide an immediate representation of major 
movements, objectives, and key terrain in support of shared situational understanding. 
These interactive CONOPs will also configure the subordinate station to provide automatic 
feedback of relevant information based on organic capabilities such as sensor feeds or local 
assessments to HHQ. Further, HHQ can easily modify the plan by sending updates as 
required which could announce and implement changes without the need for excessive 
coordination. 
NSWTG HQ battle-rhythm product creation would be streamlined as described in 
the previous section. Intelligence products should leverage visible, accessible, 
understandable, linked, trustworthy, interoperable, and secure (VAULTIS) data sources to 
automate the fusion of routine processes. This will serve to shift the burden of effort from 
the expert human to the AI/ML enabled machine to enhance speed, accuracy, and relevance 
of the final product. The human-in-the-loop / human-on-the-loop in human / machine 
interface (HMI) will enable superior understanding of cascading contexts. The time saved 
in the production cycle will result in more time available for detailed analysis activities that 
are more suitable for human intelligence. 
At the tactical edge, an expedited product generation cycle will provide forward 
units with more accurate and up-to-date information to improve overall situational 
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awareness. Further, disadvantaged units will be able to ingest optimized operational data 
into lightweight versions of the same systems used by HHQ to apply real-time data to a 
rich, tailored world model to provide a deeper understanding of the operational 
environment. In other words, a minimal amount of actual data will be distributed to the 
tactical edge, which could then be interpreted at the “last mile” to add depth and context. 
Additionally, this will open an opportunity to apply ML for distributed training at the edge, 
and AI for fusion of the output to continuously train a natively generated edge-model by 
combining this minimal amount of actual data which could potentially be further enriched 
with fused knowledge from higher-level command tiers. 
(3) Decide 
The decision-making process should remain a human centered activity, however 
one enabled by technology. Future processes should leverage AI / ML enabled C2 systems 
to fuse and summarize common sense data, historical data, standing guidance, policy, 
procedures, and doctrine within the context of the operational environment to enhance 
decision-making speed and quality. 
At the NSWTG HQ level, CCIRs and FFIRs, created digitally as part of the 
planning process, are applied against incoming reports through the use of a digital cognitive 
assistant to automatically alert the BWC of any event that meets those criteria. As part of 
a collaborative HMI pair, the AI / ML enabled cognitive assistant will organize and queue 
relevant information for the review of the BWC with a list of recommended actions based 
on existing policy, procedures, standing orders, best-practices, and historical data. For 
example, a FFIR is triggered by the cancellation of a scheduled patrol due to a medical 
emergency. This AI / ML enabled system provides the BWC with the standing orders 
regarding reporting criteria, assesses the operational impact of the cancellation, identifies 
any available assets to fill the gap, or if the activation of a branch or sequel plan is required. 
Decisions made at the individual level should be further enhanced through the use 
of cognitive assistants. A sufficiently capable, field-wearable device would provide an 
ideal platform to host a localized world view which is periodically updated using organic 
sensors or assured C2 links to maintain situational awareness. Mission, objectives, decision 
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points, and other variables could be represented within the context of the overall plan in 
order to affect synchronicity, identify possible obstacles, and inform decisions so as to 
exercise disciplined initiative in accordance with the commander’s intent. 
Human-machine teaming will significantly improve the overall performance at the 
individual level. The digitization of historical data and experiences will provide a baseline 
of knowledge to produce a standard level of competence across the force in order to 
produce informed, appropriate, and repeatable decision cycles at all levels of command. 
(4) Act 
Again, the final step in the execute process is to act. Future systems should monitor 
activities and decisions to facilitate automatic reporting in order to maintain shared 
situational awareness and unity of action. 
c. Post-Mission Reporting and Analysis 
Future systems will open the door for a more comprehensive collection of mission 
debriefs, after action reports, and historic operational data. 
(1) After Action Reports 
After action reports will be collected in a similar manner as before, but future 
systems should provide additional functionality by using natural language processing 
techniques to better collect, analyze, and correlate findings. AARs tend to be repetitive, 
meaning things that were a problem this time, were a problem last time and the time before 
that. Future AARs should be digitized, centralized, categorized, and analyzed to identify 
patterns and trends and produce actionable information to inform future planning, 
operations or technical requirements. 
As previously discussed, future plans will rely heavily on the analysis of digitized 
AARs. This will give an indication of what worked, what did not and under what 
circumstances so that it can be applied to future plans. AARs will further serve to validate 
the efficacy of a plan in order to provide an OPT with ranked examples of prior planning 
efforts. Additionally, since the planning process is digitized, the AAR process will enable 
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the comparison of similar plans to identify which mission variables or circumstances cause 
one plan to fail while the other succeeded. 
Operations will benefit from the ability to consolidate and analyze AARs to develop 
an operational profile for a certain area or mission type. Instead of sifting through a never-
ending series of written reports, future systems should identify common subjects and 
recurring issues which constitute a risk to mission or risk to force, ranked by probability 
and severity. This will serve to inform future operations, increase long-term institutional 
knowledge, and feed back into the execution process. From a mission command 
perspective, this serves to reinforce mutual trust. 
These processes can be used for technical purposes, as well. For instance, if 
multiple AARs report an inability to establish UHF LOS communications in certain 
operational area, this could prompt further investigation to identify a root cause such as 
local interference or jamming activities by the enemy. The same issue in multiple theaters 
could indicate an equipment or training deficiency which would prompt a separate 
response. Previously, this pattern would have required the notice of an individual with 
sufficient knowledge to understand what they were seeing. The same techniques could be 
used to identify deficiencies in training, operations, or even correct assumptions about the 
operational environment itself. 
(2) Additional Reports 
Digitizing incidental reporting sources such as chat logs, station logs, voice data, 
sensor data, and all manners of operational reports represent an untapped gold-mine in the 
development of historical data. Much like AARs, these data sources will be analyzed to 
identify trends, recreate events, and feed all manners of long-term data analysis projects. 
For instance, residual RADAR data can be analyzed to inform patterns of life within a 
geographic region. Another example would be the routine analysis of situational reports to 
recreate events over a period in an effort to achieve a higher-level understanding than is 
provided by a single AAR. 
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the relationships between command and control, mission 
command, and how they relate to the planning, execution, and after-action reporting and 
analysis. Current C2 systems focus on providing situational awareness which allows some 
to proclaim that information advantage has already been achieved in support of the shared 
understanding element of mission command. This, in fact, proves to be somewhat 
premature as situational awareness and situational understanding can have many different 
levels, as previously discussed. Beyond this, little is done to support the remaining 
elements of competence, mutual trust, mission orders, commander’s intent, disciplined 
initiative, and risk acceptance. 
Digitizing NSW data in a mission command environment will lay the foundation 
for the in-depth analysis required to improve processes, optimize communications, and 
enhance the decision-making process through human-machine teaming. Competence will 
increase by analyzing and condensing tactical and procedural concepts down easily 
understandable information feeds based on current policy and previous experiences to 
enhance the proficiency at the individual level. Mutual trust will be enhanced when 
commanders, subordinates, and partners are able to assume a greater level of understanding 
and ability by their counterparts based on common inputs while performing assigned tasks. 
Shared understanding will obviously benefit as additional sources enrich the common 
operational picture within the context of the operational environment, well beyond basic 
track data and in accordance with mission orders. Further, digitization presents a golden 
opportunity to focus on the problem of the Third Wave of AI, also known as contextual 
adaptivity. Triggering events, as well as action and maneuvering events must become the 
first-class citizens of the future data architecture, replacing the entity-noun which has 
occupied that role since the advent of object-oriented design.  
All of this will serve to put the individual and organization in a better position to 
execute mission and exercise disciplined initiative within the confines of commander’s 




This thesis aims to increase understanding of the nature of command and control 
and how to implement a common foundational DIK layer and supporting network 
architecture in support of Digital Mission Command. To accomplish this, the author 
conducted an in-depth review of the relevant literature on command and control, command 
and control systems, digital mission command, the NSW operational chain of command, 
associated communications infrastructures and emerging technologies. This chapter 
presents the research conclusions, recommendations for growing a digital NSW force, and 
suggestions for future research. 
A. RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
Current C2 systems focus on the feedback, information, and communications 
functions of control which addresses only the “shared situational awareness” element of 
mission command. Future operations will take place within a non-permissive, DDIL 
environment, against adversaries who possess capabilities that are equal or possibly 
superior to our own. The current C2 model, which relies on robust communications 
networks, reach back, and high-capacity SATCOM links, will become untenable. This will 
be true especially at the tactical level which operates under the assumption that they will 
become isolated, meaning they will have to rely on their own organic systems, sensors, and 
expertise to accomplish mission objectives. Thus, mission command, as the primary 
command and control approach, will dominate operations. 
Mission command depends on creating situational understanding for the 
participating units. Technology will play a central role in building out the DIK pyramid in 
order to achieve that situational understanding. A data strategy based on the 
implementation of a common, scalable, core data management framework must be defined 
to serve as the foundation upon which everything else is built. All relevant operational data 
must be identified and stored in a manner that is visible, accessible, understandable, linked, 
trustworthy, interoperable, and secure in order to automate routine processes and reduce 
cognitive load. A tremendous amount of effort and coordination will be required in the 
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realm of data organization so as to synchronize NSW efforts both internally, and in 
conjunction with USSOCOM, TSOC, and DOD initiatives.  
The mission command philosophy of centralized planning and decentralized 
execution and control is the key for NSW success in projected future operational 
environments. A new emphasis must be placed on digitizing and analyzing historical and 
operational data in order to provide additional insight to the operator in the form of rich 
track data, recommendations, alerts, and projected future states within the context of a 
given situation.  
Moreover, the increase in unmanned systems and smart agents will require 
increased human-machine teaming concepts that must be employed in an effort to raise the 
relative competence of the force. Enabled by the digitization of knowledge and past 
experience, this more competent force will naturally increase mutual trust among 
commanders, subordinates, and partners. As the level of shared understanding amongst the 
various levels of command increases, the commander can delegate greater authority and 
decision-making ability to subordinate forces which will provide more opportunity for the 
execution of disciplined initiative in accordance with commander’s guidance at a 
controlled level of risk.  
 Finally, communications, network, and data architectures must be developed that 
support operations in both permissive and non-permissive environments. Ideally, a tactical 
unit could receive raw data inputs from sensors or other sources and generate actionable 
information, however that will not always be possible. In those cases, data must be curated, 
correlated, fused, and sanitized at the higher level where processing and connectivity is 
readily available and then forwarded to the distant-end using available means. This can be 
accomplished through a variety of methods including next-generation, relatively high-
capacity LPI / LPD communications channels such as DSSS, WCDMA or LEO satellite 
communications, or by alternate means such as MANETs, broadcasts, or UAV relays. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CREATING A DIGITAL NSW 
COMMUNITY 
The question is simple: How does NSW proceed in creating digital mission 
command? Chapter IV envisions the future NSW fighting force leveraging a robust and 
adaptive data environment, where despite competing requirements for bandwidth, NSW’s 
data strategy promotes the delivery of valuable information to the right place at the right 
time, supporting adaptive operations and a robust, quick cycle, decision-making process. 
Chapter IV analysis also suggests that the current data infrastructure, with stovepiped 
databases, reliance on purely manual processes, and reams of undigitized information, is 
unsuited to support digital mission command, especially at the tactical level.  
Digitization of the planning process will ensure that efforts are more efficient, 
complete, and historically informed which will standardize and synchronize the inputs into 
the execution process. Execution will benefit by consolidating operational data and the use 
of automated and AI / ML enabled C2 systems to achieve a heightened level of situational 
understanding. Results captured by a robust after-action and historic data analysis function 
would feed back into planning and execution in order to refine the entire process. All data 
needs to be collected, ingested, catalogued, and curated with consistent representation, to 
allow platform-agnostic applications to access all relevant data in order to create the desired 
output. This requires a robust, flexible data flow architecture, so when communications 
and networks are not available, units still perform. The following recommendations suggest 
initial steps on how to implement such a data strategy.  
a. Create a data-centric organizational culture across the NSW community 
In order to fully realize the benefits and advantages afforded by data-analysis, 
automation, and associated AI/ML technologies, NSW must place emphasis on the creation 
of a data-centric culture. By developing local expertise in support of a comprehensive data 
strategy, NSW will not only enable organic data efforts, but also be in a better position to 
influence and participate in higher-level USSOCOM and DOD initiatives in support of 
NSW interests.  
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Recommend establishing an NSW Data Operations working group. This working 
group will be chaired by the N3 Department, co-chaired by the N2 Department, with 
remaining departments and functional leads as contributing members. The reason is that 
processes are driven by operations and intelligence, then further enabled by technology. 
As a center of gravity for the command, the operations department has both the insight and 
the authority to effectively manage the efforts of the working group and implement 
associated actions at the command level. The alternative would likely result in the N6 
presenting technical solutions in search of operational problems. 
Members assigned to the working group will serve as the data SMEs for their 
respective areas and should be educated in data strategies, data science methodologies, and 
be aware of current DOD and private sector capabilities and initiatives. The first order of 
business should be the creation of high-level NSW data strategy which formalizes the 
composition and purpose of the working group as well as its roles and responsibilities at 
NAVSPECWARCOM. This should include the appointment of an O-6 level steering 
committee who will provide high-level direction and guidance to the working group, and 
present findings and recommendations to the commander. Once the working group reaches 
a certain level of maturity, recommend additional working groups be stood up at 
subordinate commands in order to gain additional insight, develop expertise, and 
coordinate data-related efforts across the community. 
Trained data scientists and engineers must be an integral part of these working 
groups. These people serve to solidify data operations processes, educate the users, and 
ensure the operational insights are melded with the new technologies in support of NSW 
objectives. They will ensure compliance with DOD data rules and regulations, help build 
a governance process, and ensure synchronization with the broader SOF community.  
b. Establish a common data management framework 
Creating a robust DIK layer that is able to ingest and store all operational data is 
essential for the development and use of advanced automated and AI/ML-enabled 
command and control systems. This layer will provide a shared, scalable, centralized data 
management framework that separates the storage layer from the database and processing 
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frameworks and will provide a common foundation to promote increased interoperability 
at the contextual level.  
The existing SIE / SOFNET cloud infrastructure provides an ideal environment for 
the construction of a data lake to hold large amounts of raw data in their respective native 
formats. Data must be collected, tagged, categorized, and indexed using formally defined 
lexicons, taxonomies and ontologies. In order to avoid the trappings of traditional relational 
databases, the heart of the DIK layer should be a well-structured, authoritative multi-
dimensional array which enables the quick and efficient processing of data based on a 
variety of criteria including level of command, level of abstraction, classification, and 
spatial-temporal measures. The DIK layer should ingest data from a data lake that serves 
as an authoritative source of unaltered data which can then be leveraged by secondary 
applications in order to achieve desired results. These results are then returned back to the 
structured storage of the DIK layer’s multi-dimensional array. Subsets can then be created 
from the primary DIK layer storage to support specific mission sets, functions, or, given 
the anticipated DDIL operating environment, to serve as local storage at the unit or 
individual system level. 
Once the core framework is established, legacy databases and stovepiped data 
should be identified and converted to the multi-dimensional array formats using 
commercially available software such as TileDB or ZARR. This will transform hierarchical 
tables of legacy relational databases into a single entity comprised of multiple dimensions, 
viewed in the context of an array, that promotes data exploitation and the application of 
adjacency matrices to represent and process graphs. While beyond the scope of this thesis, 
such techniques will enable advanced knowledge operations in the future, such as current 
and projected world views. 
c. Formally define and digitize C2 processes 
Digitization of C2 processes requires in-depth analysis in order to fully identify the 
steps, inputs, outputs, and dependencies of the function being modeled. This can be a 
deceptively difficult task under normal circumstances, which is further complicated in the 
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NSW community as many processes are poorly documented, or require a high level of 
human interpretation to execute. 
First, utilize the NSW Data Operations working group to identify and prioritize key 
processes that contribute to the execution of mission command. These can be items as 
simple as an individual CCIR, or something more complex such as the previously described 
planning process. Once these processes are identified, they should be further reduced into 
their constituent sub-processes through functional decomposition. It is unlikely that 
working group will possess a sufficient level of expertise or skill in data analysis to fully 
define the process, at which point the process will be turned over to the NSW data 
scientists, data engineers, or to a competent third-party who specializes in process analysis. 
However, continued close coordination with the operators is a must. 
Operational data that feeds these identified processes should be digitized, labeled, 
and stored in a centralized location at the earliest opportunity. An interesting characteristic 
of data is that the more one accumulates, the more inferences can be drawn from it, and the 
more uses can be found for it. Unfortunately, once the opportunity to collect relevant data 
is missed, it is extremely difficult to recover. 
As noted, there is considerable work to be accomplished, and adding data scientists 
and engineers requires resources and time. The payoff, though, will be a data-infused force 
that can out-think and respond more rapidly than the enemy, and will transform the NSW.  
C. AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
a. Human-machine teaming interfaces at the tactical level 
Human-machine teaming will be a critical piece of the digital mission command 
initiative moving forward. While it is certainly important to develop systems that analyze, 
organize, categorize, and display information, it is equally important that this information 
is easily accessed and understood by operators. Nowhere is this truer than at the tactical 
level where events happen more quickly and can overwhelm an operator’s cognitive ability 
to process or benefit from additional information. This requires an in-depth understanding 
of what information is useful, what is a distraction, under which circumstance cognitive 
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saturation occurs, and what type of user interface best facilitates effective human-machine 
teaming.  
b. NSW communications and network architectures 
Due to the sensitive nature of NSW operations, the distribution of information 
communications and network architectures is extremely limited. Further research is 
required to fully understand the communication and network architectures of NSW and the 
SOF community at an appropriate level of classification and detail. This will inform 
subsequent research efforts by providing a realistic representation of transport capabilities 
to focus data collection, distribution, and analysis efforts in support of future systems and 
processes.  
c. Data optimization in support of tactical C2 and communications systems 
in a DDIL environment 
To realize the full benefits of digital mission command, digitized information and 
knowledge must be shared across all levels of command. This becomes increasingly 
difficult as one approaches the tactical edge where capacity is typically limited, if available 
at all. Traditionally, this has been addressed through the development of communications 
systems that increase bandwidth. A second approach is to optimize mission-specific data 
availability, by developing contextually aware C2 systems that are able to infer and push 
valuable information and knowledge updates about the operational environment for 
decision-making using a canonical, adaptive world-model, instead of explicitly relying on 
network traffic prioritization based on human-based pre-operational experience-driven 
decisions. In other words, saying a little to mean a lot. This will open the door for the use 
of a variety of LPI / LPD communications methods including DSSS, WCDMA, and 
broadcasts. Further, MANETs could be employed to exchange data at a peer-to peer-level 
in order to achieve local convergence in the absence a reach-back capability to established 
network infrastructure. Finally, NSW should explore the Navy’s new Communications as 
a Service capability which focuses on many of the same concepts.  
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d. NSW AI strategy and vision 
As AI efforts within the DOD gather momentum, the NSW must keep pace to 
develop a comprehensive strategy for various applications including intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance, and operations. This research considered opportunities and 
implications at a higher level, however future success will depend on the articulation of a 
clear vision for future capabilities that is backed up by a detailed plan of actions and 
milestones. This vision should address combat applications as well other functions such as 
MT&E, administration, and logistics. 
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